Network security

ABSTRACT

A gateway or other network device may be configured to monitor endpoint behavior, and to request a verification of user presence at the endpoint under certain conditions suggesting, e.g., malware or other endpoint compromise. For example, when a network request is directed to a low-reputation or unknown network address, user presence may be verified to ensure that this action was initiated by a human user rather than automatically by malware or the like. User verification may be implicit, based on local behavior such as keyboard or mouse activity, or the user verification may be explicit, such as where a notification is presented on a display of the endpoint requesting user confirmation to proceed.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is related to the following commonly-owned U.S. patentapplications that are incorporated herein by reference in theirentirety: U.S. application Ser. No. 15/136,687 filed on Apr. 22, 2016entitled “Labeling Network Flows According to Source Applications,” andU.S. application Ser. No. 15/136,762 filed on Apr. 22, 2016 entitled“Secure Labeling of Network Flows.”

TECHNICAL FIELD

This application relates to techniques for improving network security onbusiness and home networks, and on mobile devices.

BACKGROUND

There is a need for improved home and business (e.g., enterprise)network security to prevent compromise, e.g., data leakage, damage, andother negative consequences for compromised endpoints. Even with thetechniques that are currently available, it remains possible forattackers to compromise endpoints.

In addition, an increase in the use of mobile devices has coincided withan increase in malware that targets mobile operating systems andapplications included on mobile devices. Mobile devices typically havedifferent operating systems and software architectures, differentcapabilities, and different user interactions than other computingdevices, and they are often attached to a different networkinfrastructure—specifically a cellular telephony environment—withdifferent service providers. This computing environment presentsspecific vulnerabilities and security challenge. There remains a needfor improved security techniques to address the growing number, type,and sophistication of malicious attacks targeting mobile devices.

SUMMARY

In general, in an aspect, a gateway or other network device isconfigured to monitor endpoint behavior, and to request a verificationof user presence at the endpoint under certain conditions suggesting,e.g., malware or other endpoint compromise. For example, when a networkrequest is directed to a low-reputation or unknown network address, userpresence may be verified to ensure that this action was initiated by ahuman user rather than automatically by malware or the like. Userverification may be implicit, based on local behavior such as keyboardor mouse activity, or the user verification may be explicit, such aswhere a notification is presented on a display of the endpointrequesting user confirmation to proceed.

In an aspect, a computer program product for monitoring network securitybased on endpoint user presence may include computer executable codeembodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium that, whenexecuting on a gateway in an enterprise network, performs the steps ofconnecting an endpoint to a data network through the gateway, detectinga network request by a process executing on the endpoint to a remoteresource that presents a potential security risk including at least oneof a request to download an executable in violation of a networksecurity policy or a request directed to an unknown address in violationof the network security policy, evaluating a status of the endpoint todetermine whether a user is present at the endpoint, and executing asecurity measure in response to the network request when no user isdetected at the endpoint.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features.Evaluating the status of the endpoint may include examining a secureheartbeat from the endpoint for information about whether the user ispresent. Evaluating the status of the endpoint may include transmittinga request to the endpoint for a user input. The status may includewhether a user is logged in to the endpoint. The status may includewhether a display of the endpoint is locked. The status may include arecord of keyboard or mouse activity within a predetermined time window.

In an aspect, a method of operating a gateway includes connecting anendpoint to a data network through the gateway, detecting a networkrequest by a process executing on the endpoint to a remote resource thatpresents a potential security risk, evaluating a status of the endpointto determine whether a user is present at the endpoint, and executing asecurity measure in response to the network request when no user isdetected at the endpoint.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thenetwork request may include a request for a download of an executablefrom the data network. The network request may include a requestdirected to an unknown address. The network request may include arequest directed to a known source of malware. Evaluating the status ofthe endpoint may include querying the endpoint about whether the user ispresent. Evaluating the status of the endpoint may include examining asecure heartbeat from the endpoint for information about whether theuser is present. Evaluating the status of the endpoint may includetransmitting a request to the endpoint for a user input. The status mayinclude whether a user is logged in to the endpoint. The status mayinclude whether a display of the endpoint is locked. The status mayinclude a record of keyboard or mouse activity within a predeterminedtime window.

In an aspect, a system includes a network device including a networkinterface configured to couple in a communicating relationship with adata network that includes an endpoint, a memory on the network device,and a processor on the network device. The processor may be configuredto execute instructions stored in the memory to perform the steps ofconnecting an endpoint to the network device through the networkinterface, detecting a network request by a process executing on theendpoint to a remote resource that presents a potential security risk,evaluating a status of the endpoint to determine whether a user ispresent at the endpoint, and executing a security measure in response tothe network request when no user is detected at the endpoint.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thenetwork device may include a firewall. The network device may include agateway. The network device may include a threat management facility.

In an aspect, a system includes an endpoint including a networkinterface configured to couple the endpoint in a communicatingrelationship with a data network, a memory on the endpoint, and aprocessor on the endpoint. The processor may be configured to executeinstructions stored in the memory to perform the steps of monitoring astatus of the endpoint, periodically creating a status indicatorcharacterizing the status, generating a user presence indicatorcontaining an indication of whether a human user is present at theendpoint, creating a heartbeat containing the status indicator and theuser presence indicator, and transmitting the heartbeat through thenetwork interface to a gateway that couples the endpoint to a datanetwork.

Securing a mobile device against malware may include an analysis ofevents executing on the mobile device to detect and identify unexpectedbehaviors and events, and further determining whether these unexpectedbehaviors and events are authorized or unauthorized. Specific runtimeevents may be compared to patterns of expected user input/interaction onthe mobile device, or generalized background behavior patterns occurringwithout user input/interaction, to determine whether events are expectedor unexpected, and/or to determine whether events are authorized orpotentially malicious. Examples of unexpected and potentially maliciousevents on mobile devices, particularly when they occur without specificuser interaction, may include making phone calls, accessing or makingchanges to the contacts/phone book, accessing user habits such asbrowser settings/history and other communication logs, accessing files,accessing the camera and audio, and so forth.

In an aspect, a method for securing a mobile device against malwareincludes monitoring a plurality of events executed on a mobile device,and detecting a first event in the plurality of events, where the firstevent is an unexpected event generated by an application executing onthe mobile device while a user of the mobile device is not interactingwith the application. The method may also include evaluating the firstevent in a context of the mobile device to determine whether the firstevent is potentially unauthorized, and when the first event is apotentially unauthorized event, presenting a warning to the user on themobile device that the potentially unauthorized event has occurred, andrequesting user confirmation that the potentially unauthorized event beallowed to continue.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Theapplication may control a camera of the mobile device, or theapplication may control a microphone of the mobile device. Theapplication may be a communication application, a phone application, oran instant messaging application. The first event may be an instantmessage or a phone call incurring a charge to the user. The first eventmay include a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) request. The context mayinclude one or more other events functionally associated with the event,one or more other events temporally associated with the event, a historyof recent user interactions with the mobile device, or a history ofrecent user interactions with the application. The first event mayinclude access to one or more of a browsing history, personal contacts,and a communications log on the mobile device. The context may include atime of the first event, or a reputation of the application. Thereputation may be based on one or more of a popularity of theapplication, a reputation of a provider of the application, and aninstalled base of the application among a population of users.

In an aspect, a computer program product for securing a mobile deviceagainst malware may include computer executable code embodied in anon-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on a mobiledevice, performs the steps of monitoring a plurality of events executedon a mobile device, and detecting a first event in the plurality ofevents, where the first event is an unexpected event generated by anapplication executing on the mobile device while a user of the mobiledevice is not interacting with the application. The code may alsoperform the steps of evaluating the first event in a context of themobile device to determine whether the first event is potentiallyunauthorized, and when the first event is a potentially unauthorizedevent, presenting a warning to the user on the mobile device that thepotentially unauthorized event has occurred, and requesting userconfirmation that the potentially unauthorized event be allowed tocontinue.

In an aspect, a mobile device includes a display, a communicationsinterface configured to couple the mobile device in a communicatingrelationship with a network, a processor, and a memory bearing computercode that, when executing on the processor, performs the steps ofmonitoring a plurality of events executed on the mobile device, anddetecting a first event in the plurality of events, where the firstevent is an unexpected event generated by an application executing onthe mobile device while a user of the mobile device is not interactingwith the application. The code may also perform the steps of evaluatingthe first event in a context of the mobile device to determine whetherthe first event is potentially unauthorized, and when the first event isa potentially unauthorized event, presenting a warning to the user thatthe potentially unauthorized event has occurred.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Themobile device may be at least one of a smart phone and a tablet. Themobile device may further include at least one of a camera and amicrophone.

In an aspect, a computer program product for managing network flows mayinclude computer executable code embodied in a non-transitory computerreadable medium that, when executing on a network device, performs thestep of receiving a network message from an endpoint at the networkdevice, the network message including a source address for the endpoint,a destination address for an intended recipient of the network message,a label that identifies an application that generated the networkmessage on the endpoint, and a payload of data. The code may alsoperform the steps of processing the network message on the networkdevice to extract the label, determining a reputation of theapplication, and routing the network message to the destination addressconditionally based on the reputation of the application that generatedthe network message.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thecode may also perform the step of caching the label for the applicationand the reputation of the application on the network device. The labelmay include a name of the endpoint. The label may be cryptographicallysigned by the endpoint. The label may include the reputation of theapplication, or a user identifier that identifies a user of theapplication on the endpoint. The network device may include a gateway, arouter, or a threat management facility for an enterprise network thatincludes the endpoint.

In an aspect, a method for managing network flows based on sources ofdata may include receiving a network message from an endpoint at anetwork device, the network message including a source address for theendpoint, a destination address for an intended recipient of the networkmessage, a label that identifies an application that generated thenetwork message on the endpoint, and a payload of data. The method mayalso include processing the network message on the network device toextract the label, and routing the network message based on theapplication that generated the network message.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Themethod may also include caching the label for the application and areputation of the application on the network device. The label mayinclude a name of the endpoint. The label may be cryptographicallysigned by the endpoint. The label may include the reputation of theapplication, or a user identifier that identifies a user of theapplication on the endpoint.

In an aspect, a system may include a network device including a networkinterface configured to couple the network device in a communicatingrelationship with a data network that includes an endpoint, a memory onthe network device, and a processor on the network device. The processormay be configured to execute instructions stored in the memory toperform the steps of receiving a network message from an endpointthrough the network interface, the network message including a sourceaddress for the endpoint, a destination address for an intendedrecipient of the network message, a label that identifies an applicationthat generated the network message on the endpoint, and a payload ofdata, processing the network message to extract the label, and routingthe network message based on the application that generated the networkmessage.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thenetwork device may include at least one of a gateway, a router, and athreat management facility. The processor may be further configured toperform the steps of determining a reputation of the application androuting the network message to the destination address conditionallybased on the reputation of the application that generated the networkmessage. The processor may be further configured to extract a useridentifier from the label that identifies a user of the application onthe endpoint.

In an aspect, a system may include an endpoint including a networkinterface configured to couple the endpoint in a communicatingrelationship with a data network, a memory on the endpoint, and aprocessor on the endpoint. The processor may be configured to executeinstructions stored in the memory to perform the steps of generating alabel for a network message created by a process executing on theendpoint and associated with an application, where the network messageincludes a payload and a header and where the label includes anidentifier for the application, adding the label to the header of thenetwork message, and transmitting the network message through thenetwork interface to a remote location on the data network.

In an aspect, a computer program product for managing network flows atan endpoint may include computer executable code embodied in anon-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on one ormore computing devices, performs the step of receiving a network messagefrom a process executing on the endpoint, where the process is based onan application and where the network message includes a payload and aheader and is addressed to a remote location accessible from theendpoint through a data network. The code may also perform the steps ofgenerating a label for the network message, the label includinginformation about a source of the network message on the endpoint,cryptographically signing the label to provide a signed label verifyingan identity of the endpoint, adding the signed label to the header ofthe network message, and transmitting the network message from theendpoint to the remote location through the data network.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thelabel may include an identifier for the application, an identifier forthe endpoint, or an identifier of a user of the process on the endpoint.The computer program product may further include code that performs thestep of encrypting information within the label. The label may include ahealth status of the endpoint.

In an aspect, a method for managing network flows at an endpoint mayinclude receiving a network message from a process executing on theendpoint, where the process is based on an application and where thenetwork message includes a payload and a header. The network message maybe addressed to a remote location accessible from the endpoint through adata network. The method may also include generating a label for thenetwork message, the label including information about a source of thenetwork message on the endpoint, encrypting the label with acryptographic key thereby providing an encrypted label, adding theencrypted label to the header of the network message, and transmittingthe network message from the endpoint to the remote location through thedata network.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thelabel may include an identifier for the application, an identifier forthe endpoint, an identifier of a user of the process on the endpoint, ora health status of the endpoint. Encrypting the label may includecryptographically signing the label.

In an aspect, a system may include an endpoint including a networkinterface configured to couple the endpoint in a communicatingrelationship with a data network, a memory on the endpoint, and aprocessor on the endpoint. The processor may be configured to executeinstructions stored in the memory to perform the steps of receiving anetwork message from a process executing on the endpoint, where theprocess is based on an application and where the network messageincludes a payload and a header, the network message addressed to aremote location accessible from the endpoint through a data network,generating a label for the network message, the label includinginformation about a source of the network message on the endpoint,encrypting the label with a cryptographic key thereby providing anencrypted label, adding the encrypted label to the header of the networkmessage, and transmitting the network message from the endpoint to theremote location through the data network.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thelabel may include an identifier for the application. Encrypting thelabel may include cryptographically signing the label.

In an aspect, a method for managing network flows at a network devicemay include receiving a network message from an endpoint at the networkdevice. The network message may include a source address for theendpoint, a destination address for an intended recipient of the networkmessage, an encrypted label that identifies an application thatgenerated the network message on the endpoint, and a payload of data.The method may also include processing the network message on thenetwork device to extract the label, decrypting the encrypted label witha cryptographic key to provide a decrypted label, and routing thenetwork message based on the decrypted label.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Theencrypted label may be signed to enable cryptographic verification of asource of the encrypted label. The method may also include receiving anindication that the application is compromised and preventing routing ofadditional network traffic for the application through the networkdevice. The method may further include detecting an absence of anexpected heartbeat from the endpoint for the application and preventingrouting of additional network traffic for the application through thenetwork device until the expected heartbeat is received. The networkdevice may include at least one of a gateway, a firewall, a router, anda threat management facility.

In an aspect, a computer program product for monitoring network securitybased on endpoint user presence may include computer executable codeembodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium that, whenexecuting on a gateway in an enterprise network, performs the steps ofconnecting an endpoint to a data network through the gateway, detectinga network request by a process executing on the endpoint to a remoteresource that presents a potential security risk including at least oneof a request to download an executable in violation of a networksecurity policy or a request directed to an unknown address in violationof the network security policy, evaluating a status of the endpoint todetermine whether a user is present at the endpoint, and executing asecurity measure in response to the network request when no user isdetected at the endpoint.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features.Evaluating the status of the endpoint may include examining a secureheartbeat from the endpoint for information about whether the user ispresent. Evaluating the status of the endpoint may include transmittinga request to the endpoint for a user input. The status may includewhether a user is logged in to the endpoint, whether a display of theendpoint is locked, or a record of keyboard or mouse activity within apredetermined time window.

In an aspect, a method of operating a gateway may include connecting anendpoint to a data network through the gateway, detecting a networkrequest by a process executing on the endpoint to a remote resource thatpresents a potential security risk, evaluating a status of the endpointto determine whether a user is present at the endpoint, and executing asecurity measure in response to the network request when no user isdetected at the endpoint.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thenetwork request may include a request for a download of an executablefrom the data network, a request directed to an unknown address, or arequest directed to a known source of malware. Evaluating the status ofthe endpoint may include querying the endpoint about whether the user ispresent. Evaluating the status of the endpoint may include examining asecure heartbeat from the endpoint for information about whether theuser is present. Evaluating the status of the endpoint may includetransmitting a request to the endpoint for a user input. The status mayinclude whether a user is logged in to the endpoint, whether a displayof the endpoint is locked, or a record of keyboard or mouse activitywithin a predetermined time window.

In an aspect, a system may include a network device including a networkinterface configured to couple in a communicating relationship with adata network that includes an endpoint, a memory on the network device,and a processor on the network device. The processor may be configuredto execute instructions stored in the memory to perform the steps ofconnecting an endpoint to the network device through the networkinterface, detecting a network request by a process executing on theendpoint to a remote resource that presents a potential security risk,evaluating a status of the endpoint to determine whether a user ispresent at the endpoint, and executing a security measure in response tothe network request when no user is detected at the endpoint.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thenetwork device may include a firewall, a gateway, or a threat managementfacility.

In an aspect, a system may include an endpoint including a networkinterface configured to couple the endpoint in a communicatingrelationship with a data network, a memory on the endpoint, and aprocessor on the endpoint. The processor may be configured to executeinstructions stored in the memory to perform the steps of monitoring astatus of the endpoint, periodically creating a status indicatorcharacterizing the status, generating a user presence indicatorcontaining an indication of whether a human user is present at theendpoint, creating a heartbeat containing the status indicator and theuser presence indicator, and transmitting the heartbeat through thenetwork interface to a gateway that couples the endpoint to a datanetwork.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the devices,systems, and methods described herein will be apparent from thefollowing description of particular embodiments thereof, as illustratedin the accompanying drawings. The drawings are not necessarily to scale,emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the principles of thedevices, systems, and methods described herein.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs).

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system.

FIG. 8 shows a process for verifying user presence on an endpoint.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of a method for securing a mobile device againstpotential or actual compromise, such as malware.

FIG. 10 shows an example display of a mobile device according to animplementation.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanyingfigures, in which preferred embodiments are shown. The foregoing may,however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construedas limited to the illustrated embodiments set forth herein.

All documents mentioned herein are hereby incorporated by reference intheir entirety. References to items in the singular should be understoodto include items in the plural, and vice versa, unless explicitly statedotherwise or clear from the context. Grammatical conjunctions areintended to express any and all disjunctive and conjunctive combinationsof conjoined clauses, sentences, words, and the like, unless otherwisestated or clear from the context. Thus, the term “or” should generallybe understood to mean “and/or” and so forth.

Recitation of ranges of values herein are not intended to be limiting,referring instead individually to any and all values falling within therange, unless otherwise indicated herein, and each separate value withinsuch a range is incorporated into the specification as if it wereindividually recited herein. The words “about,” “approximately,” or thelike, when accompanying a numerical value, are to be construed asindicating a deviation as would be appreciated by one of ordinary skillin the art to operate satisfactorily for an intended purpose. Ranges ofvalues and/or numeric values are provided herein as examples only, anddo not constitute a limitation on the scope of the describedembodiments. The use of any and all examples, or exemplary language(“e.g.,” “such as,” or the like) provided herein, is intended merely tobetter illuminate the embodiments and does not pose a limitation on thescope of the embodiments or the claims. No language in the specificationshould be construed as indicating any unclaimed element as essential tothe practice of the embodiments.

In the following description, it is understood that terms such as“first,” “second,” “third,” “above,” “below,” and the like, are words ofconvenience and are not to be construed as implying a chronologicalorder or otherwise limiting any corresponding element unless expresslystate otherwise.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management. Specifically,FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram of a threat management system providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats—a context inwhich the following techniques may usefully be deployed. One aspectrelates to corporate policy management and implementation through aunified threat management facility 100. As will be explained in moredetail below, a threat management facility 100 may be used to protectcomputer assets from many threats, both computer-generated threats anduser-generated threats. The threat management facility 100 may bemulti-dimensional in that it may be designed to protect corporate assetsfrom a variety of threats and it may be adapted to learn about threatsin one dimension (e.g. worm detection) and apply the knowledge inanother dimension (e.g. spam detection). Policy management is one of thedimensions for which the threat management facility can provide acontrol capability. A corporation or other entity may institute a policythat prevents certain people (e.g. employees, groups of employees, typesof employees, guest of the corporation, etc.) from accessing certaintypes of computer programs. For example, the corporation may elect toprevent its accounting department from using a particular version of aninstant messaging service or all such services. In this example, thepolicy management facility 112 may be used to update the policies of allcorporate computing assets with a proper policy control facility or itmay update a select few. By using the threat management facility 100 tofacilitate the setting, updating and control of such policies thecorporation only needs to be concerned with keeping the threatmanagement facility 100 up to date on such policies. The threatmanagement facility 100 can take care of updating all of the othercorporate computing assets.

It should be understood that the threat management facility 100 mayprovide multiple services, and policy management may be offered as oneof the services. We will now turn to a description of certaincapabilities and components of the threat management system 100.

Over recent years, malware has become a major problem across theInternet 154. From both a technical perspective and a user perspective,the categorization of a specific threat type, whether as virus, worm,spam, phishing exploration, spyware, adware, or the like, is becomingreduced in significance. The threat, no matter how it is categorized,may need to be stopped at various points of a networked computingenvironment, such as one of an enterprise facility 102, including at oneor more laptops, desktops, servers, gateways, communication ports,handheld or mobile devices, firewalls, and the like. Similarly, theremay be less and less benefit to the user in having different solutionsfor known and unknown threats. As such, a consolidated threat managementfacility 100 may need to apply a similar set of technologies andcapabilities for all threats. In certain embodiments, the threatmanagement facility 100 may provide a single agent on the desktop, and asingle scan of any suspect file. This approach may eliminate theinevitable overlaps and gaps in protection caused by treating virusesand spyware as separate problems, while simultaneously simplifyingadministration and minimizing desktop load. As the number and range oftypes of threats has increased, so may have the level of connectivityavailable to all IT users. This may have led to a rapid increase in thespeed at which threats may move. Today, an unprotected PC connected tothe Internet 154 may be infected quickly (perhaps within 10 minutes)which may require acceleration for the delivery of threat protection.Where once monthly updates may have been sufficient, the threatmanagement facility 100 may automatically and seamlessly update itsproduct set against spam and virus threats quickly, for instance, everyfive minutes, every minute, continuously, or the like. Analysis andtesting may be increasingly automated, and also may be performed morefrequently; for instance, it may be completed in 15 minutes, and may doso without compromising quality. The threat management facility 100 mayalso extend techniques that may have been developed for virus andmalware protection, and provide them to enterprise facility 102 networkadministrators to better control their environments. In addition tostopping malicious code, the threat management facility 100 may providepolicy management that may be able to control legitimate applications,such as VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and thelike, that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102.

The threat management facility 100 may provide an enterprise facility102 protection from computer-based malware, including viruses, spyware,adware, Trojans, intrusion, spam, policy abuse, uncontrolled access, andthe like, where the enterprise facility 102 may be any entity with anetworked computer-based infrastructure. In an embodiment, FIG. 1 maydepict a block diagram of the threat management facility 100 providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats. Theenterprise facility 102 may be corporate, commercial, educational,governmental, or the like, and the enterprise facility's 102 computernetwork may be distributed amongst a plurality of facilities, and in aplurality of geographical locations, and may include administration 134,a firewall 138A, an appliance 140A, server 142A, network devices 148A-B,clients 144A-D, such as protected by computer security facilities 152,and the like. It will be understood that any reference herein to clientfacilities may include the clients 144A-D shown in FIG. 1 andvice-versa. The threat management facility 100 may include a pluralityof functions, such as security management facility 122, policymanagement facility 112, update facility 120, definitions facility 114,network access rules facility 124, remedial action facility 128,detection techniques facility 130, testing facility 118, threat researchfacility 132, and the like. In embodiments, the threat protectionprovided by the threat management facility 100 may extend beyond thenetwork boundaries of the enterprise facility 102 to include clients144D (or client facilities) that have moved into network connectivitynot directly associated or controlled by the enterprise facility 102.Threats to client facilities may come from a plurality of sources, suchas from network threats 104, physical proximity threats 110, secondarylocation threats 108, and the like. Clients 144A-D may be protected fromthreats even when the client 144A-D is not located in association withthe enterprise 102, such as when a client 144E-F moves in and out of theenterprise facility 102, for example when interfacing with anunprotected server 142C through the Internet 154, when a client 144F ismoving into a secondary location threat 108 such as interfacing withcomponents 140B, 142B, 148C, 148D that are not protected, and the like.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide anenterprise facility 102 protection from a plurality of threats tomultiplatform computer resources in a plurality of locations and networkconfigurations, with an integrated system approach. It should beunderstood that an enterprise model is applicable to organizations andusers of any size or type. For example, an enterprise may be or mayinclude a group or association of endpoints, networks, users, and thelike within or outside of one or more protected locations. It should beunderstood that an enterprise may include one or more offices orbusiness locations, or one or more homes, where each location, orportions of each location, or a collection of locations may be treatedas a client facility.

In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may be provided as astand-alone solution. In other embodiments, the threat managementfacility 100 may be integrated into a third-party product. Anapplication programming interface (e.g. a source code interface) may beprovided such that the threat management facility 100 may be integrated.For instance, the threat management facility 100 may be stand-alone inthat it provides direct threat protection to an enterprise or computerresource, where protection is subscribed to directly 100. Alternatively,the threat management facility 100 may offer protection indirectly,through a third-party product, where an enterprise may subscribe toservices through the third-party product, and threat protection to theenterprise may be provided by the threat management facility 100 throughthe third-party product.

The security management facility 122 may include a plurality of elementsthat provide protection from malware to enterprise facility 102 computerresources, including endpoint security and control, email security andcontrol, web security and control, reputation-based filtering, controlof unauthorized users, control of guest and non-compliant computers, andthe like. The security management facility 122 may be a softwareapplication that may provide malicious code and malicious applicationprotection to a client facility computing resource. The securitymanagement facility 122 may have the ability to scan the client facilityfiles for malicious code, remove or quarantine certain applications andfiles, prevent certain actions, perform remedial actions and performother security measures. In embodiments, scanning the client facilitymay include scanning some or all of the files stored to the clientfacility on a periodic basis, scanning an application when theapplication is executed, scanning files as the files are transmitted toor from the client facility, or the like. The scanning of theapplications and files may be performed to detect known malicious codeor known unwanted applications. In an embodiment, new malicious code andunwanted applications may be continually developed and distributed, andupdates to the known code database may be provided on a periodic basis,on a demand basis, on an alert basis, or the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide email security andcontrol, where security management may help to eliminate spam, viruses,spyware and phishing, control of email content, and the like. Thesecurity management facility's 122 email security and control mayprotect against inbound and outbound threats, protect emailinfrastructure, prevent data leakage, provide spam filtering, and thelike. In an embodiment, security management facility 122 may provide forweb security and control, where security management may help to detector block viruses, spyware, malware, unwanted applications, help controlweb browsing, and the like, which may provide comprehensive web accesscontrol enabling safe, productive web browsing. Web security and controlmay provide Internet use policies, reporting on suspect devices,security and content filtering, active monitoring of network traffic,URI filtering, and the like. In an embodiment, the security managementfacility 122 may provide for network access control, which may providecontrol over network connections. Network control may stop unauthorized,guest, or non-compliant systems from accessing networks, and may controlnetwork traffic that may not be bypassed from the client level. Inaddition, network access control may control access to virtual privatenetworks (VPN), where VPNs may be a communications network tunneledthrough another network, establishing a logical connection acting as avirtual network. In embodiments, a VPN may be treated in the same manneras a physical network.

The security management facility 122 may provide host intrusionprevention through behavioral based protection, which may guard againstunknown threats by analyzing behavior before software code executes.Behavioral based protection may monitor code when it runs and interveneif the code is deemed to be suspicious or malicious. Advantages ofbehavioral based protection over runtime protection may include codebeing prevented from running. Whereas runtime protection may onlyinterrupt code that has already partly executed, behavioral protectioncan identify malicious code at the gateway or on the file servers anddelete the code before it can reach endpoint computers and the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide reputation filtering,which may target or identify sources of known malware. For instance,reputation filtering may include lists of URIs of known sources ofmalware or known suspicious IP addresses, or domains, say for spam, thatwhen detected may invoke an action by the threat management facility100, such as dropping them immediately. By dropping the source beforeany interaction can initiate, potential threat sources may be thwartedbefore any exchange of data can be made.

In embodiments, information may be sent from the enterprise back to athird party, a vendor, or the like, which may lead to improvedperformance of the threat management facility 100. For example, thetypes, times, and number of virus interactions that a client experiencesmay provide useful information for the preventions of future virusthreats. This type of feedback may be useful for any aspect of threatdetection. Feedback of information may also be associated with behaviorsof individuals within the enterprise, such as being associated with mostcommon violations of policy, network access, unauthorized applicationloading, unauthorized external device use, and the like. In embodiments,this type of information feedback may enable the evaluation or profilingof client actions that are violations of policy that may provide apredictive model for the improvement of enterprise policies.

The security management facility 122 may support overall security of theenterprise facility 102 network or set of enterprise facility 102networks, e.g., by providing updates of malicious code information tothe enterprise facility 102 network and associated client facilities.The updates may include a planned update, an update in reaction to athreat notice, an update in reaction to a request for an update, anupdate based on a search of known malicious code information, or thelike. The administration facility 134 may provide control over thesecurity management facility 122 when updates are performed. The updatesmay be automatically transmitted without an administration facility's134 direct control, manually transmitted by the administration facility134, or otherwise distributed. The security management facility 122 maymanage the receipt of malicious code descriptions from a provider,distribution of the malicious code descriptions to enterprise facility102 networks, distribution of the malicious code descriptions to clientfacilities, and so forth.

The threat management facility 100 may provide a policy managementfacility 112 that may be able to block non-malicious applications, suchas VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and the like,that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102. The policy management facility 112 may be a setof rules or policies that may indicate enterprise facility 102 accesspermissions for the client facility, such as access permissionsassociated with the network, applications, external computer devices,and the like. The policy management facility 112 may include a database,a text file, a combination of databases and text files, or the like. Inan embodiment, a policy database may be a block list, a black list, anallowed list, a white list, or the like that may provide a list ofenterprise facility 102 external network locations/applications that mayor may not be accessed by the client facility. The policy managementfacility 112 may include rules that may be interpreted with respect toan enterprise facility 102 network access request to determine if therequest should be allowed. The rules may provide a generic rule for thetype of access that may be granted. The rules may be related to thepolicies of an enterprise facility 102 for access rights for theenterprise facility's 102 client facility. For example, there may be arule that does not permit access to sporting websites. When a website isrequested by the client facility, a security facility may access therules within a policy facility to determine if the requested access isrelated to a sporting website. In an embodiment, the security facilitymay analyze the requested website to determine if the website matcheswith any of the policy facility rules.

The policy management facility 112 may be similar to the securitymanagement facility 122 but with the addition of enterprise facility 102wide access rules and policies that may be distributed to maintaincontrol of client facility access to enterprise facility 102 networkresources. The policies may be defined for application type, subset ofapplication capabilities, organization hierarchy, computer facilitytype, user type, network location, time of day, connection type, or thelike. Policies may be maintained by the administration facility 134,through the threat management facility 100, in association with a thirdparty, or the like. For example, a policy may restrict IM activity toonly support personnel for communicating with customers. This may allowcommunication for departments requiring access, but may maintain thenetwork bandwidth for other activities by restricting the use of IM toonly the personnel that need access to instant messaging (IM) in supportof the enterprise facility 102. In an embodiment, the policy managementfacility 112 may be a stand-alone application, may be part of thenetwork server facility 142, may be part of the enterprise facility 102network, may be part of the client facility, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide configuration management,which may be similar to policy management, but may specifically examinethe configuration set of applications, operating systems, hardware, andthe like, and manage changes to their configurations. Assessment of aconfiguration may be made against a standard configuration policy,detection of configuration changes, remediation of improperconfiguration, application of new configurations, and the like. Anenterprise may keep a set of standard configuration rules and policieswhich may represent the desired state of the device. For example, aclient firewall may be running and installed, but in the disabled state,where remediation may be to enable the firewall. In another example, theenterprise may set a rule that disallows the use of USB disks, and sendsa configuration change to all clients, which turns off USB drive accessvia a registry.

The threat management facility 100 may also provide for the removal ofapplications that potentially interfere with the operation of the threatmanagement facility 100, such as competitor products that may also beattempting similar threat management functions. The removal of suchproducts may be initiated automatically whenever such products aredetected. In the case where such applications are services are providedindirectly through a third-party product, the application may besuspended until action is taken to remove or disable the third-partyproduct's protection facility.

Threat management against a quickly evolving malware environment mayrequire timely updates, and thus an update management facility 120 maybe provided by the threat management facility 100. In addition, a policymanagement facility 112 may also require update management (e.g., asprovided by the update facility 120 herein described). The updatemanagement for the security facility 122 and policy management facility112 may be provided directly by the threat management facility 100, suchas by a hosted system or in conjunction with the administration facility134. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide forpatch management, where a patch may be an update to an operating system,an application, a system tool, or the like, where one of the reasons forthe patch is to reduce vulnerability to threats.

The security facility 122 and policy management facility 112 may pushinformation to the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility. The enterprise facility 102 network and/or client facility mayalso or instead pull information from the security facility 122 andpolicy management facility 112 network server facilities 142, or theremay be a combination of pushing and pulling of information between thesecurity facility 122 and the policy management facility 112 networkservers 142, enterprise facility 102 network, and client facilities, orthe like. For example, the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility may pull information from the security facility 122 and policymanagement facility 112 network server facility 142 may request theinformation using the security facility 122 and policy managementfacility 112 update module; the request may be based on a certain timeperiod, by a certain time, by a date, on demand, or the like. In anotherexample, the security facility 122 and policy management facility 112network servers 142 may push the information to the enterprisefacility's 102 network and/or client facility by providing notificationthat there are updates available for download and then transmitting theinformation. The combination of the security management 122 networkserver facility 142 and security update module may functionsubstantially the same as the policy management facility 112 networkserver and policy update module by providing information to theenterprise facility 102 network and the client facility in a push orpull method. In an embodiment, the policy management facility 112 andthe security facility 122 management update modules may work in concertto provide information to the enterprise facility's 102 network and/orclient facility for control of application execution. In an embodiment,the policy update module and security update module may be combined intoa single update module.

As threats are identified and characterized, the threat managementfacility 100 may create definition updates that may be used to allow thethreat management facility 100 to detect and remediate the latestmalicious software, unwanted applications, configuration and policychanges, and the like. The threat definition facility 114 may containthreat identification updates, also referred to as definition files. Adefinition file may be a virus identity file that may includedefinitions of known or potential malicious code. The virus identity(IDE) definition files may provide information that may identifymalicious code within files, applications, or the like. The definitionfiles may be accessed by security management facility 122 when scanningfiles or applications within the client facility for the determinationof malicious code that may be within the file or application. Thedefinition files may contain a number of commands, definitions, orinstructions, to be parsed and acted upon, or the like. In embodiments,the client facility may be updated with new definition filesperiodically to provide the client facility with the most recentmalicious code definitions; the updating may be performed on a set timeperiod, may be updated on demand from the client facility, may beupdated on demand from the network, may be updated on a receivedmalicious code alert, or the like. In an embodiment, the client facilitymay request an update to the definition files from an update facility120 within the network, may request updated definition files from acomputing facility external to the network, updated definition files maybe provided to the client facility 114 from within the network,definition files may be provided to the client facility from an externalcomputing facility from an external network, or the like.

A definition management facility 114 may provide timely updates ofdefinition files information to the network, client facilities, and thelike. New and altered malicious code and malicious applications may becontinually created and distributed to networks worldwide. Thedefinition files that maintain the definitions of the malicious code andmalicious application information for the protection of the networks andclient facilities may need continual updating to provide continualdefense of the network and client facility from the malicious code andmalicious applications. The definition files management may provide forautomatic and manual methods of updating the definition files. Inembodiments, the network may receive definition files and distribute thedefinition files to the network client facilities, the client facilitiesmay receive the definition files directly, or the network and clientfacilities may both receive the definition files, or the like. In anembodiment, the definition files may be updated on a fixed periodicbasis, on demand by the network and/or the client facility, as a resultof an alert of a new malicious code or malicious application, or thelike. In an embodiment, the definition files may be released as asupplemental file to an existing definition files to provide for rapidupdating of the definition files.

In a similar manner, the security management facility 122 may be used toscan an outgoing file and verify that the outgoing file is permitted tobe transmitted per the enterprise facility 102 rules and policies. Bychecking outgoing files, the security management facility 122 may beable discover malicious code infected files that were not detected asincoming files as a result of the client facility having been updatedwith either new definition files or policy management facility 112information. The definition files may discover the malicious codeinfected file by having received updates of developing malicious codefrom the administration facility 134, updates from a definition filesprovider, or the like. The policy management facility 112 may discoverthe malicious code infected file by having received new updates from theadministration facility 134, from a rules provider, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide controlled access to theenterprise facility 102 networks. For instance, a manager of theenterprise facility 102 may want to restrict access to certainapplications, networks, files, printers, servers, databases, or thelike. In addition, the manager of the enterprise facility 102 may wantto restrict user access based on certain criteria, such as the user'slocation, usage history, need to know, job position, connection type,time of day, method of authentication, client-system configuration, orthe like. Network access rules may be developed for the enterprisefacility 102, or pre-packaged by a supplier, and managed by the threatmanagement facility 100 in conjunction with the administration facility134.

A network access rules facility 124 may be responsible for determiningif a client facility application should be granted access to a requestednetwork location. The network location may be on the same network as thefacility or may be on another network. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may verify access rights for client facilitiesfrom within the network or may verify access rights of computerfacilities from external networks. When network access for a clientfacility is denied, the network access rules facility 124 may send aninformation file to the client facility containing. For example, theinformation sent by the network access rules facility 124 may be a datafile. The data file may contain a number of commands, definitions,instructions, or the like to be parsed and acted upon through theremedial action facility 128, or the like. The information sent by thenetwork access facility rules facility 124 may be a command or commandfile that the remedial action facility 128 may access and take actionupon.

The network access rules facility 124 may include databases such as ablock list, a black list, an allowed list, a white list, an unacceptablenetwork site database, an acceptable network site database, a networksite reputation database, or the like of network access locations thatmay or may not be accessed by the client facility. Additionally, thenetwork access rules facility 124 may incorporate rule evaluation; therule evaluation may parse network access requests and apply the parsedinformation to network access rules. The network access rule facility124 may have a generic set of rules that may be in support of anenterprise facility's 102 network access policies, such as denyingaccess to certain types of websites, controlling instant messengeraccesses, or the like. Rule evaluation may include regular expressionrule evaluation, or other rule evaluation method for interpreting thenetwork access request and comparing the interpretation to theestablished rules for network access. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may receive a rules evaluation request fromthe network access control and may return the rules evaluation to thenetwork access control.

Similar to the threat definitions facility 114, the network access rulefacility 124 may provide updated rules and policies to the enterprisefacility 102. The network access rules facility 124 may be maintained bythe network administration facility 134, using network access rulesfacility 124 management. In an embodiment, the network administrationfacility 134 may be able to maintain a set of access rules manually byadding rules, changing rules, deleting rules, or the like. Additionally,the administration facility 134 may retrieve predefined rule sets from aremote provider of a set of rules to be applied to an entire enterprisefacility 102. The network administration facility 134 may be able tomodify the predefined rules as needed for a particular enterprisefacility 102 using the network access rules management facility 124.

When a threat or policy violation is detected by the threat managementfacility 100, the threat management facility 100 may perform or initiatea remedial action facility 128. Remedial action may take a plurality offorms, such as terminating or modifying an ongoing process orinteraction, sending a warning to a client or administration facility134 of an ongoing process or interaction, executing a program orapplication to remediate against a threat or violation, recordinteractions for subsequent evaluation, or the like. Remedial action maybe associated with an application that responds to information that aclient facility network access request has been denied. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may parsethe data file, interpret the various aspects of the data file, and acton the parsed data file information to determine actions to be taken onan application requesting access to a denied network location. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may accessthe threat definitions to parse the data file and determine an action tobe taken on an application requesting access to a denied networklocation. In an embodiment, the information received from the facilitymay be a command or a command file. The remedial action facility maycarry out any commands that are received or parsed from a data file fromthe facility without performing any interpretation of the commands. Inan embodiment, the remedial action facility may interact with thereceived information and may perform various actions on a clientrequesting access to a denied network location. The action may be one ormore of continuing to block all requests to a denied network location, amalicious code scan on the application, a malicious code scan on theclient facility, quarantine of the application, terminating theapplication, isolation of the application, isolation of the clientfacility to a location within the network that restricts network access,blocking a network access port from a client facility, reporting theapplication to an administration facility 134, or the like.

Remedial action may be provided as a result of a detection of a threator violation. The detection techniques facility 130 may includemonitoring the enterprise facility 102 network or endpoint devices, suchas by monitoring streaming data through the gateway, across the network,through routers and hubs, and the like. The detection techniquesfacility 130 may include monitoring activity and stored files oncomputing facilities, such as on server facilities 142, desktopcomputers, laptop computers, other mobile computing devices, and thelike. Detection techniques, such as scanning a computer's stored files,may provide the capability of checking files for stored threats, eitherin the active or passive state. Detection techniques, such as streamingfile management, may provide the capability of checking files receivedat the network, gateway facility, client facility, and the like. Thismay provide the capability of not allowing a streaming file or portionsof the streaming file containing malicious code from entering the clientfacility, gateway facility, or network. In an embodiment, the streamingfile may be broken into blocks of information, and a plurality of virusidentities may be used to check each of the blocks of information formalicious code. In an embodiment, any blocks that are not determined tobe clear of malicious code may not be delivered to the client facility,gateway facility, or network.

Verifying that the threat management facility 100 is detecting threatsand violations to established policy, may require the ability to testthe system, either at the system level or for a particular computingcomponent. The testing facility 118 may allow the administrationfacility 134 to coordinate the testing of the security configurations ofclient facility computing facilities on a network. The administrationfacility 134 may be able to send test files to a set of client facilitycomputing facilities to test the ability of the client facility todetermine acceptability of the test file. After the test file has beentransmitted, a recording facility may record the actions taken by theclient facility in reaction to the test file. The recording facility mayaggregate the testing information from the client facility and reportthe testing information to the administration facility 134. Theadministration facility 134 may be able to determine the level ofpreparedness of the client facility computing facilities by the reportedinformation. Remedial action may be taken for any of the client facilitycomputing facilities as determined by the administration facility 134;remedial action may be taken by the administration facility 134 or bythe user of the client facility.

The threat research facility 132 may provide a continuously ongoingeffort to maintain the threat protection capabilities of the threatmanagement facility 100 in light of continuous generation of new orevolved forms of malware. Threat research may include researchers andanalysts working on known and emerging malware, such as viruses,rootkits a spyware, as well as other computer threats such as phishing,spam, scams, and the like. In embodiments, through threat research, thethreat management facility 100 may be able to provide swift, globalresponses to the latest threats.

The threat management facility 100 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102, where the enterprise facility 102 may include aplurality of networked components, such as client facility, serverfacility 142, administration facility 134, firewall 138, gateway, hubsand routers 148, threat management appliance 140, desktop users, mobileusers, and the like. In embodiments, it may be the endpoint computersecurity facility 152, located on a computer's desktop, which mayprovide threat protection to a user, and associated enterprise facility102. In embodiments, the term endpoint may refer to a computer systemthat may source data, receive data, evaluate data, buffer data, or thelike (such as a user's desktop computer as an endpoint computer), afirewall as a data evaluation endpoint computer system, a laptop as amobile endpoint computer, a personal digital assistant or tablet as ahand-held endpoint computer, a mobile phone as an endpoint computer, orthe like. In embodiments, endpoint may refer to a source or destinationfor data, including such components where the destination ischaracterized by an evaluation point for data, and where the data may besent to a subsequent destination after evaluation. The endpoint computersecurity facility 152 may be an application loaded onto the computerplatform or computer support component, where the application mayaccommodate the plurality of computer platforms and/or functionalrequirements of the component. For instance, a client facility computermay be one of a plurality of computer platforms, such as Windows,Macintosh, Linux, and the like, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may be adapted to the specific platform, while maintaininga uniform product and product services across platforms. Additionally,components may have different functions to serve within the enterprisefacility's 102 networked computer-based infrastructure. For instance,computer support components provided as hubs and routers 148, serverfacility 142, firewalls 138, and the like, may require unique securityapplication software to protect their portion of the systeminfrastructure, while providing an element in an integrated threatmanagement system that extends out beyond the threat management facility100 to incorporate all computer resources under its protection.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of client facilitycomputing platforms on which the endpoint computer security facility 152is adapted. A client facility computing platform may be a computersystem that is able to access a service on another computer, such as aserver facility 142, via a network. This client facility server facility142 model may apply to a plurality of networked applications, such as aclient facility connecting to an enterprise facility 102 applicationserver facility 142, a web browser client facility connecting to a webserver facility 142, an e-mail client facility retrieving e-mail from anInternet 154 service provider's mail storage servers 142, and the like.In embodiments, traditional large client facility applications may beswitched to websites, which may increase the browser's role as a clientfacility. Clients 144 may be classified as a function of the extent towhich they perform their own processing. For instance, client facilitiesare sometimes classified as a fat client facility or thin clientfacility. The fat client facility, also known as a thick client facilityor rich client facility, may be a client facility that performs the bulkof data processing operations itself, and does not necessarily rely onthe server facility 142. The fat client facility may be most common inthe form of a personal computer, where the personal computer may operateindependent of any server facility 142. Programming environments for fatclients 144 may include CURT, Delphi, Droplets, Java, win32, X11, andthe like. Thin clients 144 may offer minimal processing capabilities,for instance, the thin client facility may primarily provide a graphicaluser interface provided by an application server facility 142, which mayperform the bulk of any required data processing. Programmingenvironments for thin clients 144 may include JavaScript/AJAX, ASP, JSP,Ruby on Rails, Python's Django, PHP, and the like. The client facilitymay also be a mix of the two, such as processing data locally, butrelying on a server facility 142 for data storage. As a result, thishybrid client facility may provide benefits from both the fat clientfacility type, such as multimedia support and high performance, and thethin client facility type, such as high manageability and flexibility.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100, and associatedendpoint computer security facility 152, may provide seamless threatprotection to the plurality of clients 144, and client facility types,across the enterprise facility 102.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of server facilities142, such as application servers, communications servers, file servers,database servers, proxy servers, mail servers, fax servers, gameservers, web servers, and the like. A server facility 142, which mayalso be referred to as a server facility 142 application, serverfacility 142 operating system, server facility 142 computer, or thelike, may be an application program or operating system that acceptsclient facility connections in order to service requests from clients144. The server facility 142 application may run on the same computer asthe client facility using it, or the server facility 142 and the clientfacility may be running on different computers and communicating acrossthe network. Server facility 142 applications may be divided amongserver facility 142 computers, with the dividing depending upon theworkload. For instance, under light load conditions all server facility142 applications may run on a single computer and under heavy loadconditions a single server facility 142 application may run on multiplecomputers. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 mayprovide threat protection to server facilities 142 within the enterprisefacility 102 as load conditions and application changes are made.

A server facility 142 may also be an appliance facility 140, where theappliance facility 140 provides specific services onto the network.Though the appliance facility 140 is a server facility 142 computer,that may be loaded with a server facility 142 operating system andserver facility 142 application, the enterprise facility 102 user maynot need to configure it, as the configuration may have been performedby a third party. In an embodiment, an enterprise facility 102 appliancemay be a server facility 142 appliance that has been configured andadapted for use with the threat management facility 100, and locatedwithin the facilities of the enterprise facility 102. The enterprisefacility's 102 threat management appliance may enable the enterprisefacility 102 to administer an on-site local managed threat protectionconfiguration, where the administration facility 134 may access thethreat resources through an interface, such as a web portal. In analternate embodiment, the enterprise facility 102 may be managedremotely from a third party, vendor, or the like, without an appliancefacility 140 located within the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance, the appliance functionality may be a shared hardware productbetween pluralities of enterprises 102. In embodiments, the appliancefacility 140 may be located at the enterprise facility 102, where theenterprise facility 102 maintains a degree of control. In embodiments, ahosted service may be provided, where the appliance 140 may still be anon-site black box to the enterprise facility 102, physically placedthere because of infrastructure requirements, but managed by a thirdparty, vendor, or the like.

Simple server facility 142 appliances may also be utilized across theenterprise facility's 102 network infrastructure, such as switches,routers, wireless routers, hubs and routers, gateways, print servers,net modems, and the like. These simple server facility appliances maynot require configuration by the enterprise facility 102, but mayrequire protection from threats via an endpoint computer securityfacility 152. These appliances may provide interconnection serviceswithin the enterprise facility 102 network, and therefore may advancethe spread of a threat if not properly protected.

A client facility may be protected from threats from within theenterprise facility 102 network using a personal firewall, which may bea hardware firewall, software firewall, or combination of these, thatcontrols network traffic to and from a client. The personal firewall maypermit or deny communications based on a security policy. Personalfirewalls may be designed for use by end-users, which may result inprotection for only the computer on which it's installed. Personalfirewalls may be able to control network traffic by providing promptseach time a connection is attempted and adapting security policyaccordingly. Personal firewalls may also provide some level of intrusiondetection, which may allow the software to terminate or blockconnectivity where it suspects an intrusion is being attempted. Otherfeatures that may be provided by a personal firewall may include alertsabout outgoing connection attempts, control of program access tonetworks, hiding the client from port scans by not responding tounsolicited network traffic, monitoring of applications that may belistening for incoming connections, monitoring and regulation ofincoming and outgoing network traffic, prevention of unwanted networktraffic from installed applications, reporting applications that makeconnection attempts, reporting destination servers with whichapplications may be attempting communications, and the like. Inembodiments, the personal firewall may be provided by the threatmanagement facility 100.

Another important component that may be protected by an endpointcomputer security facility 152 is a network firewall facility 138, whichmay be a hardware or software device that may be configured to permit,deny, or proxy data through a computer network that has different levelsof trust in its source of data. For instance, an internal enterprisefacility 102 network may have a high level of trust, because the sourceof all data has been sourced from within the enterprise facility 102. Anexample of a low level of trust is the Internet 154, because the sourceof data may be unknown. A zone with an intermediate trust level,situated between the Internet 154 and a trusted internal network, may bereferred to as a “perimeter network.” Since firewall facilities 138represent boundaries between threat levels, the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 associated with the firewall facility 138 mayprovide resources that may control the flow of threats at thisenterprise facility 102 network entry point. Firewall facilities 138,and associated endpoint computer security facility 152, may also beassociated with a network node that may be equipped for interfacingbetween networks that use different protocols. In embodiments, theendpoint computer security facility 152 may provide threat protection ina plurality of network infrastructure locations, such as at theenterprise facility 102 network entry point, i.e. the firewall facility138 or gateway; at the server facility 142; at distribution pointswithin the network, i.e. the hubs and routers 148; at the desktop ofclient facility computers; and the like. In embodiments, the mosteffective location for threat detection may be at the user's computerdesktop endpoint computer security facility 152.

The interface between the threat management facility 100 and theenterprise facility 102, and through the appliance facility 140 toembedded endpoint computer security facilities, may include a set oftools that may be the same for all enterprise implementations, but alloweach enterprise to implement different controls. In embodiments, thesecontrols may include both automatic actions and managed actions.Automatic actions may include downloads of the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 to components of the enterprise facility 102,downloads of updates to existing endpoint computer security facilitiesof the enterprise facility 102, uploaded network interaction requestsfrom enterprise facility 102 components to the threat managementfacility 100, and the like. In embodiments, automatic interactionsbetween the enterprise facility 102 and the threat management facility100 may be configured by the threat management facility 100 and anadministration facility 134 in the enterprise facility 102. Theadministration facility 134 may configure policy rules that determineinteractions, such as developing rules for accessing applications, as inwho is authorized and when applications may be used; establishing rulesfor ethical behavior and activities; rules governing the use ofentertainment software such as games, or personal use software such asIM and VoIP; rules for determining access to enterprise facility 102computing resources, including authentication, levels of access, riskassessment, and usage history tracking; rules for when an action is notallowed, such as whether an action is completely deigned or justmodified in its execution; and the like. The administration facility 134may also establish license management, which in turn may furtherdetermine interactions associated with a licensed application. Inembodiments, interactions between the threat management facility 100 andthe enterprise facility 102 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102 by managing the flow of network data into andout of the enterprise facility 102 through automatic actions that may beconfigured by the threat management facility 100 or the administrationfacility 134.

Client facilities within the enterprise facility 102 may be connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network by way of wired network facilities148A or wireless network facilities 148B. Client facilities connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network via a wired facility 148A orwireless facility 148B may receive similar protection, as bothconnection types are ultimately connected to the same enterprisefacility 102 network, with the same endpoint computer security facility152, and the same threat protected enterprise facility 102 environment.Mobile wireless facility clients 144B-F, because of their ability toconnect to any wireless 148B,D network access point, may connect to theInternet 154 outside the enterprise facility 102, and therefore outsidethe threat-protected environment of the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance the mobile client facility (e.g., the clients 144 B-F), if notfor the presence of the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayexperience a malware attack or perform actions counter to enterprisefacility 102 established policies. In addition, there may be a pluralityof ways for the threat management facility 100 to protect theout-of-enterprise facility 102 mobile client facility (e.g., the clients144 D-F) that has an embedded endpoint computer security facility 152,such as by providing URI filtering in personal routers, using a webappliance as a DNS proxy, or the like. Mobile client facilities that arecomponents of the enterprise facility 102 but temporarily outsideconnectivity with the enterprise facility 102 network may be providedwith the same threat protection and policy control as client facilitiesinside the enterprise facility 102. In addition, mobile the clientfacilities may receive the same interactions to and from the threatmanagement facility 100 as client facilities inside the enterprisefacility 102, where the mobile client facilities may be considered avirtual extension of the enterprise facility 102, receiving all the sameservices via their embedded endpoint computer security facility 152.

Interactions between the threat management facility 100 and thecomponents of the enterprise facility 102, including mobile clientfacility extensions of the enterprise facility 102, may ultimately beconnected through the Internet 154. Threat management facility 100downloads and upgrades to the enterprise facility 102 may be passed fromthe firewalled networks of the threat management facility 100 through tothe endpoint computer security facility 152 equipped components of theenterprise facility 102. In turn the endpoint computer security facility152 components of the enterprise facility 102 may upload policy andaccess requests back across the Internet 154 and through to the threatmanagement facility 100. The Internet 154 however, is also the paththrough which threats may be transmitted from their source. Thesenetwork threats 104 may include threats from a plurality of sources,including without limitation, websites, e-mail, IM, VoIP, applicationsoftware, and the like. These threats may attempt to attack a mobileenterprise client facility (e.g., the clients 144B-F) equipped with anendpoint computer security facility 152, but in embodiments, as long asthe mobile client facility is embedded with an endpoint computersecurity facility 152, as described above, threats may have no bettersuccess than if the mobile client facility were inside the enterprisefacility 102.

However, if the mobile client facility were to attempt to connect intoan unprotected connection point, such as at a secondary location 108that is not a part of the enterprise facility 102, the mobile clientfacility may be required to request network interactions through thethreat management facility 100, where contacting the threat managementfacility 100 may be performed prior to any other network action. Inembodiments, the client facility's 144 endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may manage actions in unprotected network environments suchas when the client facility (e.g., client 144F) is in a secondarylocation 108 or connecting wirelessly to a non-enterprise facility 102wireless Internet connection, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may dictate what actions are allowed, blocked, modified, orthe like. For instance, if the client facility's 144 endpoint computersecurity facility 152 is unable to establish a secured connection to thethreat management facility 100, the endpoint computer security facility152 may inform the user of such, and recommend that the connection notbe made. In the instance when the user chooses to connect despite therecommendation, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may performspecific actions during or after the unprotected connection is made,including running scans during the connection period, running scansafter the connection is terminated, storing interactions for subsequentthreat and policy evaluation, contacting the threat management facility100 upon first instance of a secured connection for further actions andor scanning, restricting access to network and local resources, or thelike. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayperform specific actions to remediate possible threat incursions orpolicy violations during or after the unprotected connection.

The secondary location 108 may have no endpoint computer securityfacilities 152 as a part of its computer components, such as itsfirewalls 138B, servers 142B, clients 144G, hubs and routers 148C-D, andthe like. As a result, the computer components of the secondary location108 may be open to threat attacks, and become potential sources ofthreats, as well as any mobile enterprise facility clients 144B-F thatmay be connected to the secondary location's 108 network. In thisinstance, these computer components may now unknowingly spread a threatto other components connected to the network.

Some threats may not come directly from the Internet 154, such as fromnon-enterprise facility controlled mobile devices that are physicallybrought into the enterprise facility 102 and connected to the enterprisefacility 102 client facilities. The connection may be made from directconnection with the enterprise facility's 102 client facility, such asthrough a USB port, or in physical proximity with the enterprisefacility's 102 client facility such that a wireless facility connectioncan be established, such as through a Bluetooth connection. Thesephysical proximity threats 110 may be another mobile computing device, aportable memory storage device, a mobile communications device, or thelike, such as CDs and DVDs, memory sticks, flash drives, external harddrives, cell phones, PDAs, MP3 players, digital cameras, point-to-pointdevices, digital picture frames, digital pens, navigation devices,tablets, appliances, and the like. A physical proximity threat 110 mayhave been previously infiltrated by network threats while connected toan unprotected network connection outside the enterprise facility 102,and when connected to the enterprise facility 102 client facility, posea threat. Because of their mobile nature, physical proximity threats 110may infiltrate computing resources in any location, such as beingphysically brought into the enterprise facility 102 site, connected toan enterprise facility 102 client facility while that client facility ismobile, plugged into an unprotected client facility at a secondarylocation 108, and the like. A mobile device, once connected to anunprotected computer resource, may become a physical proximity threat110. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayprovide enterprise facility 102 computing resources with threatprotection against physical proximity threats 110, for instance, throughscanning the device prior to allowing data transfers, through securityvalidation certificates, through establishing a safe zone within theenterprise facility 102 computing resource to transfer data into forevaluation, and the like.

Having provided an overall context for threat detection, the descriptionnow turns to a brief discussion of an example of a computer system thatmay be used for any of the entities and facilities described above.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system. In general, the computer system200 may include a computing device 210 connected to a network 202, e.g.,through an external device 204. The computing device 210 may be orinclude any type of network endpoint or endpoints as described herein,e.g., with reference to FIG. 1 above. For example, the computing device210 may include a desktop computer workstation. The computing device 210may also or instead be any suitable device that has processes andcommunicates over a network 202, including without limitation a laptopcomputer, a desktop computer, a personal digital assistant, a tablet, amobile phone, a television, a set top box, a wearable computer (e.g.,watch, jewelry, or clothing), a home device (e.g., a thermostat or ahome appliance controller), just as some examples. The computing device210 may also or instead include a server, or it may be disposed on aserver.

The computing device 210 may be used for any of the entities describedin the threat management environment described above with reference toFIG. 1. For example, the computing device 210 may be a server, a clientan enterprise facility, a threat management facility, or any of theother facilities or computing devices described therein. In certainaspects, the computing device 210 may be implemented using hardware(e.g., a desktop computer), software (e.g., in a virtual machine or thelike), or a combination of software and hardware (e.g., with programsexecuting on the desktop computer), and the computing device 210 may bea standalone device, a device integrated into another entity or device,a platform distributed across multiple entities, or a virtualized deviceexecuting in a virtualization environment.

The network 202 may include any network described above, e.g., datanetwork(s) or internetwork(s) suitable for communicating data andcontrol information among participants in the computer system 200. Thismay include public networks such as the Internet, private networks, andtelecommunications networks such as the Public Switched TelephoneNetwork or cellular networks using third generation cellular technology(e.g., 3G or IMT-2000), fourth generation cellular technology (e.g., 4G,LTE. MT-Advanced, E-UTRA, etc.) or WiMax-Advanced (IEEE 802.16m)) and/orother technologies, as well as any of a variety of corporate area,metropolitan area, campus or other local area networks or enterprisenetworks, along with any switches, routers, hubs, gateways, and the likethat might be used to carry data among participants in the computersystem 200. The network 202 may also include a combination of datanetworks, and need not be limited to a strictly public or privatenetwork.

The external device 204 may be any computer or other remote resourcethat connects to the computing device 210 through the network 202. Thismay include threat management resources such as any of thosecontemplated above, gateways or other network devices, remote servers orthe like containing content requested by the computing device 210, anetwork storage device or resource, a device hosting malicious content,or any other resource or device that might connect to the computingdevice 210 through the network 202.

The computing device 210 may include a processor 212, a memory 214, anetwork interface 216, a data store 218, and one or more input/outputdevices 220. The computing device 210 may further include or be incommunication with peripherals 222 and other external input/outputdevices 224.

The processor 212 may be any as described herein, and in general becapable of processing instructions for execution within the computingdevice 210 or computer system 200. The processor 212 may include asingle-threaded processor or a multi-threaded processor. The processor212 may be capable of processing instructions stored in the memory 214or on the data store 218.

The memory 214 may store information within the computing device 210 orcomputer system 200. The memory 214 may include any volatile ornon-volatile memory or other computer-readable medium, including withoutlimitation a Random Access Memory (RAM), a flash memory, a Read OnlyMemory (ROM), a Programmable Read-only Memory (PROM), an Erasable PROM(EPROM), registers, and so forth. The memory 214 may store programinstructions, program data, executables, and other software and datauseful for controlling operation of the computing device 200 andconfiguring the computing device 200 to perform functions for a user.The memory 214 may include a number of different stages and types fordifferent aspects of operation of the computing device 210. For example,a processor may include on-board memory and/or cache for faster accessto certain data or instructions, and a separate, main memory or the likemay be included to expand memory capacity as desired.

The memory 214 may, in general, include a non-volatile computer readablemedium containing computer code that, when executed by the computingdevice 200 creates an execution environment for a computer program inquestion, e.g., code that constitutes processor firmware, a protocolstack, a database management system, an operating system, or acombination of the foregoing, and/or code that performs some or all ofthe steps set forth in the various flow charts and other algorithmicdescriptions set forth herein. While a single memory 214 is depicted, itwill be understood that any number of memories may be usefullyincorporated into the computing device 210. For example, a first memorymay provide non-volatile storage such as a disk drive for permanent orlong-term storage of files and code even when the computing device 210is powered down. A second memory such as a random access memory mayprovide volatile (but higher speed) memory for storing instructions anddata for executing processes. A third memory may be used to improveperformance by providing even higher speed memory physically adjacent tothe processor 212 for registers, caching and so forth.

The network interface 216 may include any hardware and/or software forconnecting the computing device 210 in a communicating relationship withother resources through the network 202. This may include remoteresources accessible through the Internet, as well as local resourcesavailable using short range communications protocols using, e.g.,physical connections (e.g., Ethernet), radio frequency communications(e.g., WiFi), optical communications, (e.g., fiber optics, infrared, orthe like), ultrasonic communications, or any combination of these orother media that might be used to carry data between the computingdevice 210 and other devices. The network interface 216 may, forexample, include a router, a modem, a network card, an infraredtransceiver, a radio frequency (RF) transceiver, a near fieldcommunications interface, a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagreader, or any other data reading or writing resource or the like.

More generally, the network interface 216 may include any combination ofhardware and software suitable for coupling the components of thecomputing device 210 to other computing or communications resources. Byway of example and not limitation, this may include electronics for awired or wireless Ethernet connection operating according to the IEEE802.11 standard (or any variation thereof), or any other short or longrange wireless networking components or the like. This may includehardware for short range data communications such as Bluetooth or aninfrared transceiver, which may be used to couple to other localdevices, or to connect to a local area network or the like that is inturn coupled to a data network 202 such as the Internet. This may alsoor instead include hardware/software for a WiMax connection or acellular network connection (using, e.g., CDMA, GSM, LTE, or any othersuitable protocol or combination of protocols). The network interface216 may be included as part of the input/output devices 220 orvice-versa.

The data store 218 may be any internal memory store providing acomputer-readable medium such as a disk drive, an optical drive, amagnetic drive, a flash drive, or other device capable of providing massstorage for the computing device 210. The data store 218 may storecomputer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, andother data for the computing device 210 or computer system 200 in anon-volatile form for subsequent retrieval and use. For example, thedata store 218 may store without limitation one or more of the operatingsystem, application programs, program data, databases, files, and otherprogram modules or other software objects and the like.

The input/output interface 220 may support input from and output toother devices that might couple to the computing device 210. This may,for example, include serial ports (e.g., RS-232 ports), universal serialbus (USB) ports, optical ports, Ethernet ports, telephone ports, audiojacks, component audio/video inputs, HDMI ports, and so forth, any ofwhich might be used to form wired connections to other local devices.This may also or instead include an infrared interface, RF interface,magnetic card reader, or other input/output system for coupling in acommunicating relationship with other local devices. It will beunderstood that, while the network interface 216 for networkcommunications is described separately from the input/output interface220 for local device communications, these two interfaces may be thesame, or may share functionality, such as where a USB port is used toattach to a WiFi accessory, or where an Ethernet connection is used tocouple to a local network attached storage.

A peripheral 222 may include any device used to provide information toor receive information from the computing device 200. This may includehuman input/output (I/O) devices such as a keyboard, a mouse, a mousepad, a track ball, a joystick, a microphone, a foot pedal, a camera, atouch screen, a scanner, or other device that might be employed by theuser 230 to provide input to the computing device 210. This may also orinstead include a display, a speaker, a printer, a projector, a headsetor any other audiovisual device for presenting information to a user.The peripheral 222 may also or instead include a digital signalprocessing device, an actuator, or other device to support control orcommunication to other devices or components. Other I/O devices suitablefor use as a peripheral 222 include haptic devices, three-dimensionalrendering systems, augmented-reality displays, magnetic card readers,and so forth. In one aspect, the peripheral 222 may serve as the networkinterface 216, such as with a USB device configured to providecommunications via short range (e.g., BlueTooth, WiFi, Infrared, RF, orthe like) or long range (e.g., cellular data or WiMax) communicationsprotocols. In another aspect, the peripheral 222 may provide a device toaugment operation of the computing device 210, such as a globalpositioning system (GPS) device, a security dongle, or the like. Inanother aspect, the peripheral may be a storage device such as a flashcard, USB drive, or other solid state device, or an optical drive, amagnetic drive, a disk drive, or other device or combination of devicessuitable for bulk storage. More generally, any device or combination ofdevices suitable for use with the computing device 200 may be used as aperipheral 222 as contemplated herein.

Other hardware 226 may be incorporated into the computing device 200such as a co-processor, a digital signal processing system, a mathco-processor, a graphics engine, a video driver, and so forth. The otherhardware 226 may also or instead include expanded input/output ports,extra memory, additional drives (e.g., a DVD drive or other accessory),and so forth.

A bus 232 or combination of busses may serve as an electromechanicalplatform for interconnecting components of the computing device 200 suchas the processor 212, memory 214, network interface 216, other hardware226, data store 218, and input/output interface. As shown in the figure,each of the components of the computing device 210 may be interconnectedusing a system bus 232 or other communication mechanism forcommunicating information.

Methods and systems described herein can be realized using the processor212 of the computer system 200 to execute one or more sequences ofinstructions contained in the memory 214 to perform predetermined tasks.In embodiments, the computing device 200 may be deployed as a number ofparallel processors synchronized to execute code together for improvedperformance, or the computing device 200 may be realized in avirtualized environment where software on a hypervisor or othervirtualization management facility emulates components of the computingdevice 200 as appropriate to reproduce some or all of the functions of ahardware instantiation of the computing device 200.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system as contemplated herein. Ingeneral, the system may include an endpoint 302, a firewall 304, aserver 306 and a threat management facility 308 coupled to one anotherdirectly or indirectly through a data network 305, all as generallydescribed above. Each of the entities depicted in FIG. 3 may, forexample, be implemented on one or more computing devices such as thecomputing device described above with reference to FIG. 2. A number ofsystems may be distributed across these various components to supportthreat detection, such as a coloring system 310, a key management system312 and a heartbeat system 314, each of which may include softwarecomponents executing on any of the foregoing system components, and eachof which may communicate with the threat management facility 308 and anendpoint threat detection agent 320 executing on the endpoint 302 tosupport improved threat detection and remediation.

The coloring system 310 may be used to label or ‘color’ software objectsfor improved tracking and detection of potentially harmful activity. Thecoloring system 310 may, for example, label files, executables,processes, network communications, data sources and so forth with anysuitable. A variety of techniques may be used to select static and/ordynamic labels for any of these various software objects, and to managethe mechanics of applying and propagating coloring information asappropriate. For example, a process may inherit a color from anapplication that launches the process. Similarly a file may inherit acolor from a process when it is created or opened by a process, and/or aprocess may inherit a color from a file that the process has opened.More generally, any type of labeling, as well as rules for propagating,inheriting, changing, or otherwise manipulating such labels, may be usedby the coloring system 310 as contemplated herein. A suitable coloringsystem is described in greater detail below with reference to FIG. 4.

The key management system 312 may support management of keys for theendpoint 302 in order to selectively permit or prevent access to contenton the endpoint 302 on a file-specific basis, a process-specific basis,an application-specific basis, a user-specific basis, or any othersuitable basis in order to prevent data leakage, and in order to supportmore fine-grained and immediate control over access to content on theendpoint 302 when a security compromise is detected. Thus for example,if a particular process executing on the endpoint is compromised, orpotentially compromised or otherwise under suspicion, keys to thatprocess may be revoked in order to prevent, e.g., data leakage or othermalicious activity. A suitable key management system useful in thiscontext is described in greater detail below with reference to FIG. 5.

The heartbeat system 314 may be used to provide periodic or aperiodicinformation from the endpoint 302 or other system components aboutsystem health, security, status, and so forth. A heartbeat may beencrypted or plaintext, or some combination of these, and may becommunicated unidirectionally (e.g., from the endpoint 308 to the threatmanagement facility 308) or bidirectionally (e.g., between the endpoint302 and the server 306, or any other pair of system components) on anyuseful schedule. A suitable heartbeat system is described in greaterdetail below with reference to FIG. 6.

In general, these various monitoring and management systems maycooperate to provide improved threat detection and response. Forexample, the coloring system 310 may be used to evaluate when aparticular process is potentially opening inappropriate files, and apotential threat may be confirmed based on an interrupted heartbeat fromthe heartbeat system 314. The key management system 312 may then bedeployed to revoke keys to the process so that no further files can beopened, deleted or otherwise modified. More generally, the cooperationof these systems enables a wide variety of reactive measures that canimprove detection and remediation of potential threats to an endpoint.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs). In general, the system400 may include a number of entities participating in a threatmanagement process such as any of the entities and threat managementprocesses described herein. The threat management process may forexample employ techniques such as behavioral tracking, encryption,endpoint recording, reputation-based threat detection, behavioral-basedthreat detection, signature-based threat detection, and combinations ofthe foregoing, or any other suitable techniques for detecting threats toendpoints in an enterprise.

In general, the system 400 may include a number of endpoints 402, 412and a threat management facility 404 in an enterprise 410, such as anyof the enterprises described above. An external analysis facility 406may analyze threat data and provide rules and the like for use by thethreat management facility 404 and endpoints 402, 412 in managingthreats to the enterprise 410. The threat management facility 404 mayreside in a local appliance (e.g., embedded within, or locally coupledto the endpoint 402), a virtual appliance (e.g., which could be run by aprotected set of systems on their own network systems), a private cloud,a public cloud, and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may storelocally-derived threat information. The analysis facility 406 may alsoor instead receive threat information from a third party source 416 suchas MITRE Corporation or any other public, private, educational or otherorganization that gathers information on network threats and providesanalysis and threat detection information for use by others. Each ofthese components may be configured with suitable programming toparticipate in the various threat detection and management techniquescontemplated herein. The threat management facility 404 may monitor anystream of data from an endpoint 402 exclusively, or use the full contextof intelligence from the stream of all protected endpoints 402, 412 orsome combination of these.

The endpoint 402 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in theenterprise 410 or otherwise operate on an enterprise network. This may,for example, include a server, a client such as a desktop computer or amobile computing device (e.g., a laptop computer, a wearable device, atablet, and the like), a cellular phone, a smart phone, or othercomputing device suitable for participating in the enterprise 410.

In general, the endpoint 402 may include any number of computing objectssuch as an object 418 labeled with a descriptor 420. While the termobject has a number of specific meanings in the art, and in particularin object-oriented programming, it will be understood that the term‘object’ as used herein is intended to be significantly broader, and mayinclude any data, process, file or combination of these includingwithout limitation any process, application, executable, script, dynamiclinked library, file, data, database, data source, data structure,function, resource locator (e.g., uniform resource locator (URL) orother uniform resource identifier (URI)), or the like that might bemanipulated by one of the computing devices described herein.

An object 418 may also or instead include a remote resource, such as aresource identified in a URL. That is, while the objects 418 in FIG. 4are depicted as residing on the endpoint 402, an object 418 may alsoreside elsewhere in the system 400, while still being labeled with adescriptor 420 and tracked by the monitor 421 of the endpoint 402. Theobject 418 may be an item that is performing an action or causing anevent, or the object 418 may be an item that is receiving the action orresult of an event (i.e., the item in the system 400 being acted upon).

Where the object 418 is data or includes data, the object 418 may beencrypted or otherwise protected, or the object 418 may be unencryptedor otherwise unprotected. The object 418 may be a process or othercomputing object that performs an action, which may include a singleevent or a collection or sequence of events taken by a process. Theobject 418 may also or instead include an item such as a file or linesof code that are executable to perform such actions. The object 418 mayalso or instead include a computing component upon which an action istaken, e.g., a system setting (e.g., a registry key or the like), a datafile, a URL, or the like. The object 418 may exhibit a behavior such asan interaction with another object or component of the system 400.

In one aspect, objects 418 may be described in terms of persistence. Theobject 418 may, for example, be a part of a process, and remainpersistent as long as that process is alive. The object 418 may insteadbe persistent across an endpoint 402 and remain persistent as long as anendpoint 402 is active or alive. The object 418 may instead be a globalobject having persistence outside of an endpoint 418, such as a URL or adata store. In other words, the object 418 may be a persistent objectwith persistence outside of the endpoint.

Although many if not most objects 418 will typically be benign objectsthat may be found on a normal, operating endpoint, an object 418 maycontain software associated with an advanced persistent threat (APT) orother malware that resides partially or entirely on the endpoint 402.The associated software may have reached the endpoint 402 in a varietyof ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically on theendpoint 402 by a malicious source. It will be understood that theassociated software may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the associated software may include anexecutable file that can execute independently, or the associatedsoftware may be a macro, plug-in, or the like that executes withinanother application. Similarly, the associated software may manifest asone or more processes or threads executing on the endpoint 402. Further,the associated software may install from a file on the endpoint 402 (ora file remote from the endpoint 402), and the associated software maycreate one or more files such as data files or the like while executing.Associated software should be understood to generally include all suchfiles and processes except where a specific file or process is morespecifically noted.

A threat such as an APT may also take the form of an attack where noaltered or additional software is directly added or modified on theendpoint 402. Instead, an adversary may reuse existing software on thesystem 400 to perform the attacks. It is for this reason that simplyscanning for associated software may be insufficient for the detectionof APTs and it may be preferable to detect APTs based on the behavior ofthe software and associated objects 418 that are used by, for, and withthat software.

An object coloring system 414 may apply descriptors 420 to objects 418on the endpoint 402. This may be performed continuously by a backgroundprocess on the endpoint 402, or it may occur whenever an object 418 isinvolved in an action, such as when a process makes a call to anapplication programming interface (API) or takes some other action, orwhen a URL is used to initiate a network request, or when a read or awrite is performed on data in a file. This may also or instead include acombination of these approaches as well as other approaches, such as bypre-labeling a file or application when it is moved to the endpoint 402,or when the endpoint 402 is started up or instantiated. In general, theobject coloring system 414 may add, remove or change a color at anylocation and at any moment that can be practicably instrumented on acomputer system.

As noted above, the term ‘object’ as used herein is intended to includea wide range of computing objects and as such, the manner in whichparticular objects 418 are labeled or ‘colored’ with descriptors 420 mayvary significantly. Any object 418 that is performing an action (such asa process or application) may be colored at the time of and/or with alabel corresponding to the action, or likewise any object 418 that isthe target of the action (such as a file or other data) may be coloredat the time that it is used and/or with a label corresponding to aprocess or the like using the object 418. Furthermore, the operatingsystem runtime representation of the object 418 may be colored, or thepersistent object outside of the operating system may be colored (as isthe case for a File Handle or File Object within the operating system orthe actual file as stored in a file system), such as within anencryption header or other header applied to the file, or as part of adirectory attribute or any other persistent location within the file orfile system. A former coloring may be ephemerally tracked while theoperating system maintains the representation and the latter may persistlong after any reboots of the same operating system and likewise havemeaning when read or used by other endpoints 402. For processes, eachfile handle may be supplemented with a pointer or other mechanism forlocating a descriptor 420 for a particular object 420 that is a process.More specifically, each object 418 may be colored in any manner suitablefor appending information to that object 418 so that the correspondingdescriptor 420 can be retrieved and, where appropriate, updated.

The coloring system 414 may apply any suitable rules for adding andchanging descriptors 420 for objects 418. For example, when a processwith a certain descriptor accesses data with a different descriptor, thedescriptor for the process may be updated to correspond to the data, orthe descriptor for the data may be updated to correspond to the process,or some combination of these. Any action by or upon an object 418 maytrigger a coloring rule so that descriptors 420 can be revised at anyrelevant time(s) during processing.

In one aspect, colors will not explicitly indicate a compromisedsecurity state or other good/bad types of distinctions (although theymay be adapted to this use). Instead, colors may record some knowninformation or understanding about an object 418, such as a source, apurpose, and so forth. In this context, colors will not be used to labelactual or potential security compromises, but to identifyinconsistencies among interacting objects 418, and to restrict orcontrol access and use accordingly. For example, where an endpoint usesfile-system-based encryption as described herein, a process that iscolored as exposed to external resources (e.g., the Internet) may beprohibited from accessing cleartext data for protected files. Colors canalso be used in other contexts such as intrusion prevention, routingrules, and detection of odd or questionable behavior.

In one aspect, colors may be implemented as flags associated withobjects 418 that provide a short hand cache of potentially relevantinformation. While this information could also be obtained for an object418 through a careful inspection of related activity logs or other datarecording activities, the use of a cache of flags for coloringinformation makes the coloring information directly available andimmediately actionable, as distinguished from post hoc forensicactivities that are otherwise supported by data logging.

In one aspect, colors as contemplated herein may fall into two differentcategories: static colors and dynamic colors. Static colors may beexplicitly applied based on, e.g., a controlling application. Forexample, a static color may specify a status of an application or data,or an associated type of application (e.g., productivity, mail client,messaging, browser, word processing, financial, spreadsheet, etc.). Inthis context, a process will generally inherit static colors from asource executable, and will permit inferences for appropriate behaviorand related processes. Dynamic colors may be assigned based on directobservation of executing processes, and may not be inherited ortransferred among processes (although the presence of a dynamic colormay be used to draw another coloring inference upon interaction withanother process). Thus the inheritance of colors may depend in part uponthe type of color that is applied, or upon explicit inheritance rulesprovided for a particular color.

A descriptor 420 may take a variety of forms, and may in general includeany information selected for relevance to threat detection. This may,for example, be a simple categorization of data or processes such astrusted or untrusted. For example, in one embodiment described herein,data and processes are labeled as either ‘IN’ (e.g., trusted) or ‘OUT’(e.g., untrusted). The specific content of the label is unimportant, andthis may be a binary flag, text string, encrypted data or otherhuman-readable and/or machine-readable identifier, provided that thedescriptor 420 can facilitate discrimination among labeled files—in thisexample, between trusted objects 418 and untrusted objects 418 so that,e.g., trusted data can be selectively decrypted or encrypted for usewith trusted processes. Similarly, data may be labeled as corporate dataor private data, with similar type-dependent processing provided. Forexample, private data may be encrypted with a key exclusively controlledby the data owner, while corporate data may be encrypted using aremotely managed key ring for an enterprise operated by the corporation.

In another aspect, the descriptor 420 may provide a multi-tiered orhierarchical description of the object 418 including any informationuseful for characterizing the object 418 in a threat management context.For example, in one useful configuration the descriptor 420 may includea type or category, static threat detection attributes, and an explicitidentification. The type or category for the object 418 may be anycategory or the like that characterizes a general nature or use of theobject 418 as inferred from behavior and other characteristics. Thismay, for example, include categories such as ‘game,’ financial,‘application,’ ‘electronic mail,’ ‘image,’ ‘video,’ browser,‘antivirus,’ and so forth. The category may be more granular, or mayinclude hierarchical categories such as ‘application:spreadsheet,’‘application:word processing,’ and so forth. Such colors may be directlyinferred from a single action, a sequence of actions, or a combinationof actions and other colors, including, e.g., colors of processes andfiles related to a particular action, or other objects 418 that providecontext for a particular action or group of actions. One or more colorsmay also or instead be explicitly provided by a user or a process, orotherwise automatically or manually attributed to computer objects ascontemplated herein.

The static threat detection attributes may be any readily ascertainablecharacteristics of the object 418 useful in threat detection. This may,for example, include an antivirus signature, a hash, a file size, fileprivileges, a process user, a path or director, and so forth. Staticthreat detection attributes may also include attributes that are derivedby or supplied from other sources. For example, static threat detectionattributes may include a reputation for an object 418, which may beexpressed in any suitable or useful level of granularity such as withdiscrete categories (trusted/untrusted/unknown) or with a numericalscore or other quantitative indicator. The explicit identification may,in general, be what an object 418 calls itself, e.g., a file name orprocess name.

Some actions may transfer colors from the subject of the action to thetarget of the action. For example, when a process creates sub-processes,the sub-processes may inherit the colors of its parent(s). By way ofanother example, when a process is initially loaded from an executable,it may inherit the color(s) stored in the file system for or with theexecutable.

In general, the descriptor 420 may be provided in any suitable format.The descriptor 420 may for example be formed as a vector of binary flagsor other attributes that form the ‘color’ or description of an object418. The descriptor 420 may also, where appropriate, include scalarquantities for certain properties. For example, it may be relevant howmany times a system file was accessed, how many file handles a processhas open, how many times a remote resource was requested or how long aremote resource is connected, and this information may be suitablyencoded in the descriptor 420 for use in coloring objects with thecoloring system 414 and applying rules for IOC detection by the IOCmonitor 421.

An indication of compromise (IOC) monitor 421 may be provided toinstrument the endpoint 402 so that any observable actions by orinvolving various objects 418 can be detected. As with the coloringsystem 414, it will be understood that the types of observable actionswill vary significantly, and the manner in which the endpoint 402 isinstrumented to detect such actions will depend on the particular typeof object 418. For example, for files or the like, an API for a filesystem may be used to detect reads, writes, and other access (e.g.,open, read, write, move, copy, delete, etc.), and may be configured toreport to or otherwise initiate monitoring of the action taken with thefile through the file system. As another example, kernel objects may beinstrumented at the corresponding object handle or in some other manner.As a further example, a kernel driver may be used for intercepting aprocess startup. While a wide variety of objects are contemplatedherein, one of ordinary skill in the art may readily create suitableinstrumentation for any computing object so that it may be monitored bythe IOC monitor 421.

It will be noted that suitable instrumentation may be created for avariety of functions and circumstances. For example, instrumentation mayusefully track requests for network access or other actions back to aparticular application or process, or data payloads back to a particularfile or data location. One of ordinary skill in the art can readilyimplement suitable traces and/or logging for any such information thatmight be useful in a particular IOC monitoring operation.

In general, the IOC monitor 421 applies rules to determine when there isan IOC 422 suitable for reporting to a threat management facility 404.It will be understood that an endpoint 402 may, in suitablecircumstances and with appropriate information, take immediate localaction to remediate a threat. However, the monitor 421 mayadvantageously accumulate a sequence of actions, and still moreadvantageously may identify inconsistencies or unexpected behaviorwithin a group of actions with improved sensitivity by comparingdescriptors 420 for various objects 418 involved in relevant actions andevents. In this manner, rules may be applied based upon the descriptors420 that better discriminate malicious activity while reducing thequantity and frequency of information that must be communicated to aremote threat management facility 404. At the same time, all of therelevant information provided by the descriptors 420 can be sent in anIOC 422 when communicating a potential issue to the threat managementfacility 404. For example, during the course of execution, a specificprocess (as evidenced by its observed actions) may be assigned colordescriptors indicating that it is a browser process. Further, thespecific process may be assigned an attribute indicating that it hasexposed itself to external URLs or other external data. Subsequently,the same process may be observed to be taking an action suitable for aninternal or system process, such as opening up shared memory to anotherprocess that has coloring descriptions indicating that it is a systemprocess. When this last action is observed, an inconsistency in thevarious color descriptors between the subject of the action—theexternally exposed browser process—and the target of the action mayresult in a well-defined IOC, which may be directly processed withimmediate local action taken. The IOC may also or instead be reportedexternally as appropriate.

Thus, an endpoint 402 in an enterprise 410 may be instrumented with acoloring system 414 and monitor 421 to better detect potentiallymalicious activity using descriptors 420 that have been selected forrelevance to threat detection along with a corresponding set of rulesdeveloped for the particular descriptors 420 that are being used tolabel or color various objects 418. By way of example, the object 418may be a web browser that starts off being colored as a ‘browser’ and an‘internet facing’ application. Based on this descriptor 420, a range ofbehaviors or actions may be considered normal, such as accessing remotenetwork resources. However, if an object 418 colored with thisdescriptor 420 attempted to elevate privileges for a process, or toaccess a registry or system files, then this inconsistency in action maytrigger a rule violation and result in an IOC 422.

In general, any action or series of actions that cumulatively invoke aparticular reporting or action rule may be combined into an IOC 422 andcommunicated to the threat management facility 404. For example, an IOC422 may include a malicious or strange behavior, or an indication of amalicious or strange behavior. The IOC 422 may be a normalized IOC thatexpresses one or more actions in a platform independent manner. That is,the IOC 422 may express a malicious behavior or suspected maliciousbehavior without reference to platform-specific information such asdetails of an operating system (e.g., iOS, MacOS, Windows, Android,Linux, and so forth), hardware, applications, naming conventions, and soforth. Thus, a normalized IOC may be suitable for identifying aparticular threat across multiple platforms, and may include platformindependent processes, actions, or behaviors, or may express suchprocess, actions, or behaviors in a platform independent manner. Thenormalized IOC may be generated from the IOC 422, e.g., it may be aconverted version of the IOC 422 suitable for use with multipleplatforms, or it may simply be any IOC 422 that has been created in aplatform independent form. Process colorization (i.e., using thecoloring system 414) as described herein may be used to create anormalized IOC.

In general, a threat management facility 404 for the enterprise 410 mayinclude an IOC collector 426 that receives the IOC 422 from the endpoint402 and determines an appropriate action. This may include any suitableremedial action, or where one or more IOCs 422 are inconclusive,continued monitoring or increased monitoring as appropriate.

The threat management facility 404 may provide a variety of threatmanagement or monitoring tools 424, any of which may be deployed inresponse to IOCs 422 collected by the IOC collector 426. These tools 424may include without limitation a scanning engine,whitelisting/blacklisting, reputation analysis, web filtering, anemulator, protection architecture, live protection, runtime detection,APT detection, network antivirus products, IOC detection, access logs, aheartbeat, a sandbox or quarantine system, and so forth.

The analysis facility 406 may provide a remote processing resource foranalyzing malicious activities and creating rules 434 suitable fordetecting IOCs 422 based on objects 420 and descriptors 420. It isgenerally contemplated that suitable attributes of certain descriptors418 and one or more rules 434 may be developed together so that objects418 can be appropriately labeled with descriptors 420 that permitinvocation of rules 434 and creation of IOCs 422 at appropriate times.The analysis facility 406 may include a variety of analysis tools 428including, without limitation, tools for regular expression,whitelisting/blacklisting, crowd sourcing, identifiers, and so forth.The analysis tools 428 may also or instead include information and toolssuch as URL look-ups, genotypes, identities, file look-up, reputations,and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may also provide numerousrelated functions such as an interface for receiving information on new,unknown files or processes, and for testing of such code or content in asandbox on the analysis facility 406.

The analysis facility 406 may also or instead include a compromisedetector 430, where the compromise detector 430 is configured to receivenew threat information for analysis and creation of new rules anddescriptors as appropriate, as well as corresponding remedial actions.The compromise detector 430 may include any tools described herein orotherwise known in the art for detecting compromises or evaluating newthreats in an enterprise 410.

In general, a rule 434 may be manually created with correspondinghuman-readable semantics, e.g., where a process is labeled as a browserprocess or other category or type that can be interpreted by a human. Itshould, however, be appreciated that the compromise detector 430 mayalso be configured to automatically generate descriptors 420 and rules434 suitable for distribution to a threat management facility 404 and anendpoint 402. In this latter mode, the meaning of a particulardescriptor 420 may not have a readily expressible human-readablemeaning. Thus, it will be understood that attributes selected forrelevance to threat detection may include conventional attributes, aswell as attributes without conventional labels or meaning except in thecontext of a particular, computer-generated rule for threat detection.

In general, the analysis facility 406 may be within an enterprise 410,or the analysis facility 406 may be external to the enterprise 410 andadministered, for example, by a trusted third party. Further, athird-party source 416 may provide additional threat data 438 oranalyses for use by the analysis facility 406 and the threat managementfacility 404. The third-party resource 416 may be a data resource thatprovides threat data 438 and analyses, where the threat data 438 is anydata that is useful in detecting, monitoring, or analyzing threats. Forexample, the threat data 438 may include a database of threats,signatures, and the like. By way of example, the third-party resource416 may be a resource provided by The MITRE Corporation.

The system 400 may include a reputation engine 440 storing a pluralityof reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may include a reputationmanagement system for the generation, analysis, identification, editing,storing, etc., of reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may includereputation-based filtering, which may be similar to the reputationfiltering discussed above with reference to FIG. 1. The reputationengine 440 may be located on the threat management facility 404 or theendpoint 402 as shown in FIG. 4, or the reputation engine 440 may belocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputation engine 440 mayreceive an IOC 422 or a stream of IOCs 422, and may generate or utilizereputations 442 for the IOCs 422. The reputation engine 440 may also orinstead receive actions, behaviors, events, interactions, and so forth,and may generate or utilize reputations 442 for any of the foregoing.The reputation engine 440 may generate or revise a reputation 442 basedon behaviors, actions, events, interactions, IOCs 422, other reputations442, a history of events, data, rules, state of encryption, colors, andso forth. The reputation engine 440 may utilize a third-party resource,e.g., for the third-party resource's reputation data.

The reputations 442 may include reputations for any of the objects 418as described herein. In general, the reputations 442 may relate to thetrustworthiness of the objects 418 or an attribute thereof (e.g., thesource of the object 418, a behavior of the object 418, another objectinteracting with the object 418, and so forth). The reputations 442 mayinclude lists of known sources of malware or known suspicious objects418. The reputations 442 may also or instead include lists of known safeor trusted resources or objects 418. The reputations 442 may be storedin a reputations database included on the reputation engine 440 orlocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputations 442 may beexpressed in any suitable or useful level of granularity such as withdiscrete categories (e.g., trusted, untrusted, unknown, malicious, safe,etc.) or with a numerical score or other quantitative indicator. Thereputations 442 may also be scaled.

In general, in the system 400 of FIG. 4, a malicious activity on theendpoint 402 may be detected by the IOC monitor 421, and a correspondingIOC 422 may be transmitted to the threat management facility 404 forremedial action as appropriate. The threat management facility 404 mayfurther communicate one or more IOCs 422 to the analysis facility 406for additional analyses and/or resolution of inconclusive results. Otherdetails and variations are provided below. While the use of coloring andIOCs as contemplated herein can improve threat detection and remediationin a number of ways, the system 400 can be further improved withgranular control over access to endpoint data using an encryptionsystem. A system for key-based management of processes and files on anendpoint is now discussed in greater detail.

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management. Generally, thesystem 500 may include endpoints 502, an administration host 504, and athreat management facility 506, which may include policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. The system 500 may provide for the management of users512, policies 514, keys 516 (e.g., disposed on key rings 518), andendpoints 502 (e.g., from the administration host 504). The system 500may utilize various storage and processing resources, which may bedisposed in a cloud or the like.

The endpoints 502 may be any of the endpoints as described herein, e.g.,with reference to the other figures. The endpoints 502 may also orinstead include other end user devices and other devices to be managed.The endpoints 502 may include a web browser for use by the users 512,with supporting cryptographic functions implemented using cryptographiclibraries in the web browser. The endpoints 502 may communicate with theother components of the system 500 using any suitable communicationinterface, which may include Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption,Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), and so forth for additionalsecurity.

The endpoints 502 may include objects as described herein. For example,the endpoints 502 may include processes 520 and files 522. The processes520 may be labeled (e.g., by a coloring system using descriptors asdescribed above) in such a manner that the process is ‘IN,’ where theprocess 520 is in compliance with policies 514 administered for theendpoint 502 from a remote threat management facility 506, or theprocess is ‘OUT,’ where the process 520 is out of compliance with apolicy (or a number of policies) in the policies 514 for an enterprise.This may provide IN processes 520A and OUT processes 520B as shown inFIG. 5. The files 522 may be similarly labeled by a coloring system withdescriptors that identify each file 522 as IN, where the file 522complies with the policies 514 and is accordingly encrypted using, e.g.,a remotely managed key ring 518, or the file is OUT, where the file 522does not conform to the policies 514 and is accordingly not encryptedusing the remotely managed key ring 518. This may provide IN files 522Aand OUT files 522B as shown in FIG. 5. One skilled in the art willrecognize that other objects of the endpoint 502 or other components ofthe system 500 may be labeled in a similar manner where they are eitherIN or OUT. By coloring objects in this manner and basing key access onthe corresponding color, the “IN” software objects may operate in aprotected environment that objectively appears to be in compliance withthe policies 514. Other files and processes may still be used on theendpoint 502, but they will operate in an “OUT” or unprotectedenvironment that cannot obtain access to any of the “IN” content orfunctionality.

In an implementation, the system 500 may include determining whether anendpoint 502 is IN or OUT or whether a component of the endpoint 502 isIN or OUT, which may be based upon a set of rules (e.g., the rulesoutlined herein) or policies such as the policies 514 described herein.In some aspects, if the entire endpoint 502 is OUT—that is, out ofcompliance with one or more policies 514, the endpoint 502 will not havekey access or access to any protected content. Conversely, if theendpoint 502 is IN, the endpoint 502 may have access to protectedcontent. Thus in one aspect, the notion of IN/OUT may be applied at anendpoint level, and data protection may be a consequence of endpointprotection. Endpoint protection may also or instead be applied at a moregranular level, e.g., by determining whether executables, processes 520,files 522, etc., on the endpoint 502 are IN or OUT, which may be basedupon rules or policies 514 as described herein.

The administration host 504 may include a web browser, which may includea cryptography library 524 and a web user interface (e.g., HTML,JavaScript, etc.). An administrator may utilize the web user interfaceto administer a key management system and perform administrativefunctions such as creating and distributing keys 516, establishingsecurity policies, creating key hierarchies and rules, and so forth. Theendpoint 502 may also include a cryptographic library 524 implementingcryptographic protocols for using key material in the key ring 518 toencrypt and decrypt data as needed.

The threat management facility 506 may include any of the threatmanagement facilities or similar systems described herein. In general,the threat management facility 506 may include a policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. Alternatively, one or more of the policy manager 508and key manager 510 may be located elsewhere on a network.

The policy manager 508 may implement one or more policies 514, andmaintain, distribute, and monitor the policies for devices in anenterprise. The policies 514 may include any policies 514 relating tosecure operation of endpoints 502 in an enterprise. This may, forexample, include hardware configuration policies, software configurationpolicies, communication policies, update policies, or any other policiesrelating to, e.g., the configuration of an endpoint 502, communicationsby an endpoint 502, software executing on an endpoint 502 and so forth.Policies 514 may include usage criteria based on, e.g., signatures,indications of compromise, reputation, user identity, and so forth. Withrespect to the key management system contemplated herein, the policies514 may include a cryptographic protocol design, key servers, userprocedures, and other relevant protocols, or these cryptographicprotocols may be provided elsewhere for use by the policy manager 508.The policies 514 may also include any rules for compliance includingthose mentioned above or any other suitable rules or algorithms that canbe applied to determine whether objects and components are ‘IN’ or ‘OUT’as contemplated herein.

The key manager 510 may be part of the threat management facility 506,or it may be remotely managed elsewhere, e.g., in a remote cloudresource or the like. The key manager 510 may also or instead bedisposed on the administration host 504 and one or more endpoints 502 ina manner independent of the threat management facility 506. In thismanner, all cryptographic operations may be isolated from the threatmanagement facility 506 and instead may be performed by a web browser orthe like executing on the administration host 504 or an endpoint 502.The key manager 510 may manage the keys 516, including managing thegeneration, exchange, storage, use, and replacement of keys 516. The keymanager 510 may include a key ring 518, where the keys 516 are disposedon the key ring 518 using one root key 526. The key manager 510 may alsoor instead include a variety of key management and other secureprocesses, including without limitation, administrator registration,establishing trust to endpoints 502, key distribution to endpoints 502,policy deployment, endpoint status reporting, and local key backup.

The users 512 may have full access to encrypted data. Alternatively, theusers 512 may have limited access to encrypted data, or no access toencrypted data. Access may be limited to users 512 using endpoints 502that are deemed ‘IN’ by the system, as well as to processes 520 that areIN, as further described herein.

The keys 210 may include cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem, i.e.,decryption keys. In one aspect, the keys 210 may be disposed on one keyring 218 using one root key 220. In general, the keys 210 may be createdand managed using, e.g., symmetric key technology, asymmetric keytechnology, or any other key technology or combination of keytechnologies suitable for securing data in an enterprise including, forexample the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES, AdvancedEncryption Standard (AES), and so forth. The cryptosystem may also orinstead include any suitable public key infrastructure or the likesupporting the distribution and use of keys for encryption, digitalsignatures, and so forth.

The key ring 518 may facilitate simplified management of the system 500.For example, by reducing the data protection system down to a single keyring 518, the system can eliminate or reduce the overhead for managementof keys 516. In one aspect, all of the data on a key ring 518 isprotected by one root key 526. By reducing the data protection systemdown to a single key ring 518 protected by one root key 526, allprivileged users 512 on uncompromised platforms can have access to allprotected data. In this embodiment, data is either ‘IN’ (i.e.,encrypted), or it's ‘OUT’ (i.e., not encrypted). In one aspect, thedefault system does not include any additional shade of access control.

The cryptography library 524 may be disposed on the administration host504 as shown in FIG. 5. The cryptography library 524 may also bedisposed on the endpoint 502, e.g., in a web browser, or it may bedisposed on another component of the system 500, or any combination ofthese. The cryptographic library 524 may be installed by anadministrator. In general, key material 530 from the key ring 518 may bestored in a cache 532 on the endpoint 502 within any suitable memory onthe endpoint 502 for use in encryption and decryption as contemplatedherein. As noted above, an enterprise that systematically uses coloringand indications of compromise can be improved through the use of a keymanagement system as contemplated herein. This system may be stillfurther improved with the addition of a heartbeat system thatcommunicates heartbeats from an endpoint containing health and statusinformation about the endpoint. A suitable heartbeat system is nowdescribed in greater detail.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats. Ingeneral, a system 600 may include an endpoint 602, a gateway 604, athreat management system 606, and an enterprise management system 608that manages an enterprise including the endpoint 602, the gateway 604,and one or more additional endpoints 610. Each of these components maybe configured with suitable programming to participate in the detectionand remediation of an advanced persistent threat (APT) or other malwarethreat as contemplated herein. Although the term “gateway” is used forthe device between an endpoint and an external network, it will beappreciated that this device may also or instead include a switch,router, firewall, and/or other network elements, any of which may beincluded in the “gateway” as that term is used herein.

The endpoint 602 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in anenterprise network. The endpoint 602 may contain a threat 612 such as anadvanced persistent threat, virus, or similar malware that resides onthe endpoint 602. The threat 612 may have reached the endpoint 602 in avariety of ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically onthe endpoint 602 by a malicious source. It will be understood that thethreat 612 may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the threat 612 may include an executable filethat can execute independently, or the threat 612 may be a macro,plug-in, or the like that executes within another application.Similarly, the threat 612 may manifest as one or more processes orthreads executing on the endpoint 602. The threat 612 may install from afile on the endpoint 602 or a file remote from the endpoint 602, and thethreat 612 may create one or more other files such as data files or thelike while executing. Advanced persistent threats can be particularlydifficult to detect and remediate, and the systems and methodscontemplated herein can advantageously provide improved sensitivity tosuch threats, as well as enabling improved remediation strategies.However, the systems and methods contemplated herein may also or insteadbe used to detect and remediate other types of malware threats. As such,in this context references to a particular type of threat (e.g., anadvanced persistent threat) should be understood to generally includeany type of malware or other threat to an endpoint or enterprise unlessa more specific threat or threat type is explicitly provided orotherwise clear from the context.

The threat 612 may be analyzed by one or more threat countermeasures onthe endpoint 602 such as a whitelisting filter 614 that approves eachitem of code before executing on the endpoint 602 and prevents executionof non-whitelisted code. The endpoint 602 may also include an antivirusengine 616 or other malware detection software that uses any of avariety of techniques to identify malicious code by reputation or othercharacteristics. A runtime detection engine 618 may also monitorexecuting code to identify possible threats. More generally, any of avariety of threat detection techniques may be applied to the threat 612before and during execution. In general, a threat 612 may evade theseand other security measures and begin executing as a process 620 on theendpoint 602.

Network traffic 622 from the process 620 may be monitored and logged bya traffic monitor 624 on the endpoint 602. The traffic monitor 624 may,for example, log a time and a source of each network request from theendpoint 602. Where the endpoint 602 is within an enterprise network,the network traffic 622 may pass through the gateway 604 in transit to adata network such as the Internet. While the gateway 604 may belogically or physically positioned between the endpoint 602 and anexternal data network, it will be understood that other configurationsare possible. For example, where the endpoint 602 is associated with anenterprise network but operating remotely, the endpoint 602 may form aVPN or other secure tunnel or the like to the gateway 604 for use of athreat management system 606, enterprise management system 608, and anyother enterprise resources.

The endpoint 602 may use a heartbeat 626 to periodically and securelycommunicate status to the gateway 604. The heartbeat 626 may be createdby a health monitor 628 within the endpoint 602, and may be transmittedto a remote health monitor 630, for example, at the gateway 604. Thehealth monitor 628 may monitor system health in a variety of ways, suchas by checking the status of individual software items executing on theendpoint 602, checking that antivirus and other security software is upto date (e.g., with current virus definition files and so forth) andrunning correctly, checking the integrity of cryptographic key stores,checking for compliance with enterprise security policies, and checkingany other hardware or software components of the endpoint 602 asnecessary or helpful for health monitoring. The health monitor 628 maythus condition the issuance of a heartbeat 626 on a satisfactory statusof the endpoint 602 according to any suitable criteria, enterprisepolices, and other evaluation techniques. The remote health monitor 630may also or instead be provided at the threat management facility 650,for example as part of the threat management system 606 or theenterprise management system 608.

The heartbeat 626 may be secured in any suitable manner so that thehealth monitor 630 can reliably confirm the source of the heartbeat 626and the status of the endpoint 602. To this end, the heartbeat 626 maybe cryptographically signed or secured using a private key so that themonitor 630 can authenticate the origin of the heartbeat 626 using acorresponding public key. In one aspect, the heartbeat 626 may include acombination of plaintext information and encrypted information, such aswhere the status information for the endpoint is provided in plaintextwhile a digital signature for authentication is cryptographicallysecured. In another aspect, all of the information in the heartbeat 626may be encrypted.

In one aspect, a key vault 632 may be provided on the endpoint tosupport cryptographic functions associated with a secure heartbeat. Anobfuscated key vault 632 may support numerous useful functions,including without limitation, private key decryption, asymmetricsigning, and validation with a chain of trust to a specific rootvalidation certificate. A variety of suitable key management andcryptographic systems are known in the art and may be usefully employedto a support the use of a secure heartbeat as contemplated herein. Thesystem may support a secure heartbeat in numerous ways. For example, thesystem may ensure that signing and decryption keys can only be used inauthorized ways and inside an intended Access Control mechanism. Thesystem may use “anti-lifting” techniques to ensure that a signing keycan only be used when the endpoint is healthy. The system may ensurethat attacking software cannot, without first reverse-engineering thekey vault 632, extract the original key material. The system may alsousefully ensure that an attacker cannot undetectably replace the publickeys in a root certificate store, either directly or indirectly, such asin an attack that tries to cause the code to validate against adifferent set of root keys without directly replacing any keys in theroot store.

A robust heartbeat 626 may usefully provide defensive mechanisms againstreverse engineering of obfuscated content (e.g., the private keymaterial stored in key vault 632, the code used to validate the correctrunning of the remainder of the systems as part of the heartbeat 626code itself) and any anti-lifting protections to prevent malware fromdirectly using the endpoint 602 (or the health monitor 628 on theendpoint 602) to continue to send out signed heartbeat packets (e.g.stating that “all is well” with the endpoint) after security mechanismshave been impaired, disabled, or otherwise compromised in any way.Lifting in this manner by malicious code can be materially mitigated byproviding statistical validation (e.g., with checksums of code) of callstacks, calling processes, and core processes. Likewise, statisticalchecks as well as checksum integrations into the cryptographiccalculations may protect against code changes in the heartbeat 626 codeitself.

A variety of useful techniques may be employed to improve security ofthe key vault 632 and the heartbeat 626. For example, the system may usedomain shifting so that original key material is inferred based onhardware and software properties readily available to the key vault 632,and to ensure that key material uses non-standard or varying algorithms.Software properties may, for example, include readily determined systemvalues such as hashes of nearby code. In another aspect, the keys may bedomain shifted in a manner unique to the endpoint 602 so that the mannerof statistical validation of call stacks and core software is unique tothe endpoint 602. Further the key vault may be provisioned so that apublic key stored in the key vault 632 is signed with a certificate (orinto a certificate chain) that can be externally validated by a networkappliance or other trusted third party or directly by the healthmonitor.

The heartbeat 626 may encode any useful status information, and may betransmitted from the endpoint 602 on any desired schedule including anyperiodic, aperiodic, random, deterministic, or other schedule.Configured in this manner, the heartbeat 626 can provide secure,tamper-resistant instrumentation for status of the endpoint 602, and inparticular an indication that the endpoint 602 is online anduncompromised. A disappearance of the heartbeat 626 from the endpoint602 may indicate that the endpoint 602 has been compromised; howeverthis may also simply indicate that the endpoint 602 has been powered offor intentionally disconnected from the network. Thus, other criteria maybe used in addition to the disappearance or interruption of theheartbeat 626 to more accurately detect malicious software. Some suchtechniques are described below, but it will be understood that this mayinclude any supplemental information that might tend to make an attackon the endpoint 602 more or less likely. For example, if the heartbeat626 is interrupted but the endpoint 602 is still sourcing networktraffic, then an inference might suitably be made that the endpoint 602is compromised.

The threat management system 606 may, in general, be any of the threatmanagement systems described herein. The enterprise management system608 generally provides tools and interfaces for administration of theenterprise and various endpoints 610 and other resources or assetsattached thereto. It will be understood that, the functions of thethreat management system 606 and the enterprise management system 608may vary, and general threat management and administration functions maybe distributed in a variety of ways between and among these and othercomponents. This is generally indicated in FIG. 6 as a threat managementfacility 650 that includes the threat management system 606 and theenterprise management system 608. It will be understood that either orboth of these system may be administered by third parties on behalf ofthe enterprise, or managed completely within the enterprise, or somecombination of these, all without departing from the scope of thisdisclosure. It will similarly be understood that a reference herein to athreat management facility 650 is not intended to imply any particularcombination of functions or components, and shall only be understood toinclude such functions or components as explicitly stated in aparticular context, or as necessary to provide countermeasures foradvanced persistent threats as contemplated herein. It also should beunderstood that the heartbeat may be monitored and/or managed by thethreat management system 606, the enterprise management system 608, oranother component of the threat management facility 650.

The system 600 may include a certificate authority 660 or similar trustauthority or the like (shown as a “trusted third party” in the figure).In order to provide a meaningfully secure heartbeat 626, the heartbeat626 may be secured with reference to a trusted authority such as acertificate authority 660 that can issue cryptographic certificatesallowing other entities to rely on assertions about identity (e.g., byenabling verification with a trusted third party), and to enablecryptographically secure communications. The cryptographic techniquesfor creating and using such certificates and relationships are wellknown, and are not repeated here. The certificate authority 660 may beadministered by the enterprise management system 608 or some otherinternal resource of the enterprise, or the certificate authority 660may be administered by a trusted third party such as any of a variety ofcommercially available certificate authorities or the like. Thus, thecertificate authority 660, or some other similar cloud service or thelike, may operate as a security broker to register, e.g., endpoints 602,610, the gateway 604, the threat management facility 650, and so forth,and provide cryptographic material for each of the other trustingentities to securely communicate with one another.

Once registered with the certificate authority 660 in this fashion, theheartbeat may be used to establish trust between the endpoint 602 andother entities, and to validate the source of the heartbeat 626 when itis received. More generally, a heartbeat 626 secured in this manner mayprovide an encrypted channel between network entities such as anendpoint 602 and the gateway 604 (or a firewall or the like). The natureof the communication may provide a technique for validating the source,as well as obfuscating the contents with encryption. Thus when, forexample, the endpoint 602 provides information about a good/healthystate or a bad/compromised state, the recipient may rely on this stateinformation and act accordingly.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system. In general, an endpoint may include aprocessing environment 702, a file system 706, a threat monitor 720 anda key wrapper 730.

The processing environment 702 may, for example, be any environment suchas an operating system or the like suitable for executing one or moreprocesses 704.

Each process 704 may be an instance of a computer program, portion of acomputer program or other code executing within the processingenvironment 702. A process 704 may execute, e.g., on a processor, groupof processors, or other processing circuitry or platform for executingcomputer-executable code. A process 704 may include executable computercode, as well as an allocation of memory, file descriptors or handlesfor data sources and sinks, security attributes such as an owner and anyassociated permissions, and a context including the content of physicalmemory used by the process 704. More generally, a process 704 mayinclude any code executing on an endpoint such as any of the endpointsdescribed herein.

The file system 706 is generally associated with an operating systemthat provides the processing environment 702, and serves as anintermediary between processes 704 executing in the processingenvironment 702 and one or more files 708 stored on the endpoint. Thefile system 706 may provide a directory structure or other construct tofacilitate organization of the files 708, and the file system 706generally supports file functions such as creating, deleting, opening,closing, reading, writing, and so forth.

An extension 710 may be included in the file system 706 by modifying theoperating system kernel. While other programming techniques may beemployed to perform the functions of an extension 710 as contemplatedherein, direct modifications of or additions to the operating systempermit the extension 710 to operate transparently to the processingenvironment 702 and the processes 704 without requiring anymodifications or adaptations. The extension 710 may, for example, beimplemented as a file system filter (in a MICROSOFT WINDOWS environment)or a mount point to a directory (in an APPLE iOS environment). Theextension 710 to the files system as contemplated herein performs twoconcurrent functions. First, the extension 710 communicates with athreat monitor 720 in order to receive updates on the security statusand exposure status of the processes 704 or the endpoint. Second theextension 710 communicates with a key wrapper 730 that provides keymaterial for encrypting and decrypting data in the files 708. Finally,the extension 710 operates to conditionally provide encryption anddecryption of the files 708 for the processes 704 based on a currentsecurity or exposure state, as described in greater detail below.

The threat monitor 720 may include any suitable threat monitoring,malware detection, antivirus program or the like suitable for monitoringand reporting on a security state of an endpoint or individual processes704 executing thereon. This may include local threat monitoring using,e.g., behavioral analysis or static analysis. The threat monitor 720 mayalso or instead use reputation to evaluate the security state ofprocesses 704 based on the processes 704 themselves, source files orexecutable code for the processes 704, or network activity initiated bythe processes 704. For example, if a process 704 requests data from aremote URL that is known to have a bad reputation, this information maybe used to infer a compromised security state of the endpoint. While athreat monitor 720 may operate locally, the threat monitor 720 may alsoor instead use remote resources such as a gateway carrying traffic toand from the endpoint, or a remote threat management facility thatprovides reputation information, malware signatures, policy informationand the like for the endpoint and other devices within an enterprisesuch as the enterprise described above.

In general, the threat monitor 720 provides monitoring of a securitystate and an exposure state of the endpoint. The security state may, forexample, be ‘compromised’, ‘secure’, or some other state or combinationof states. This may be based on detections of known malware, suspiciousactivity, policy violations and so forth. The exposure state may be‘exposed’ or ‘unexposed’, reflecting whether or not a particular process704 or file 708 has been exposed to potentially unsafe content. Thusexposure does not necessarily represent a specific threat, but thepotential for exposure to unsafe content. This may be tracked in avariety of ways, such as by using the coloring system described abovewith reference to FIG. 5.

The key wrapper 730 may contain a key ring 732 with one or more keys 734for encrypting and decrypting files 708. The key ring 732 may becryptographically protected within the key wrapper 730 in order toprevent malicious access thereto, and the key wrapper 730 maycommunicate with the extension 710 to provide keys 734 for accessing thefiles 708 at appropriate times, depending, for example, on whetherprocesses 704 are secure or exposed. In one aspect, the files 708 arestored in a non-volatile memory such as a disk drive, or in a randomaccess memory that provides a cache for the disk drive, and the keywrapper 730 may be stored in a separate physical memory such as avolatile memory accessible to the operating system and the extension 710but not to processes 704 executing in the user space of the processingenvironment 702.

In one aspect, every document or file on the endpoint may have aseparate key. This may be, for example, a unique, symmetric key that canbe used for encryption and decryption of the corresponding file. The keywrapper 730 may control access to the key material for encrypting anddecrypting individual files, and may be used by the extension 710 tocontrol access by individual processes 704 executing on the endpoint. Asdescribed herein, the extension 710 may generally control access tofiles 708 based on an exposure state, a security state, or other contextsuch as the user of a calling process or the like. In the event of asevere compromise, or a detection of a compromise independent ofparticular processes, a key shredding procedure may be invoked todestroy the entire key wrapper 730 immediately and prevent any furtheraccess to the files 708. In such circumstances, the keys can only berecovered by the endpoint when a remediation is confirmed.Alternatively, the files may be accessed directly and decrypted from asecure, remote resource that can access the keys 734.

FIG. 8 shows a process for verifying user presence on an endpoint. Ingeneral, a gateway or other network device may be configured to monitorendpoint behavior, and to determine user presence at the endpoint. Theendpoint behavior may suggest compromise, e.g., malware or otherendpoint compromise. For example, when a network request is directed toa low-reputation or unknown network address, or a network request isunusual in the amount of data downloaded or uploaded, or a networkrequest involves an unexpected protocol, user presence may be verifiedto ensure that an action was initiated by a human user rather thanautomatically by malware or the like. The network device may request averification of user presence at the endpoint. The network device mayrequest authentication of the user at the endpoint. The network devicemay receive reports of user presence at the endpoint. The network devicemay access a record of events that took place at the endpoint todetermine user presence. User verification may be implicit, based onlocal behavior such as keyboard or mouse activity, or application oroperating system events, or the user verification may be explicit, suchas where a notification is presented on a display of the endpointrequesting user confirmation to proceed, or the user is requested toauthenticate, such as by providing a password, authentication code,fingerprint, biometric reading, and so on.

As shown in step 802, the method 800 may include connecting an endpointto a data network through a gateway. The endpoint may be, for example, amobile device (e.g., a mobile smartphone, a tablet, a wearablecomputer), a laptop, a personal computer, a server, a virtual machine,or any other suitable endpoint, for example, as described herein. Thegateway may be or may include firewall functionality. The gateway may beor may include router functionality.

As shown in step 804, the method 800 may include detecting a networkrequest at the gateway, the network request initiated by a processexecuting on the endpoint. The network request may, for example, includeany of the network messages described herein, or any other networkrequest. By way of non-limiting example, the network request may includea request for a download of an executable from a data network, a dataupload, a text message, an instant message, an HTTP GET, an HTTP PUTrequest or other request to an address contained in a Uniform ResourceLocator entered, e.g., in a browser or similar application, an FTP filetransfer request, a request to login to another device on the samenetwork or a different network, or any other manually or automaticallygenerated network request.

In some implementations, step 804 may refer specifically to thedetection or other identification of potential or actual compromise. Forexample, an unusual network request, or a request that may be prohibitedor restricted by policy may be detected. A network request may beidentified in combination with other network activity or other events.

For example, the network request may not be indicative of an attack, butrather of an application or process that was authorized to be installed,and is accessing resources or otherwise that is communicating in amanner that is not desired by the user or is contrary to a securitypolicy.

A network request may be detected based on the destination of therequest. For example, a network request may be detected based on areputation of a resource such as a remote resource with a low or unknownreputation, or a remote resource known to be associated with malwaredistribution or the like. This may also or instead include a networkrequest directed to an unknown address, telephone number, messagingdestination, or a request directed to a known or suspected source ofmalware.

In some implementations, the network activity may be identified based ona protocol of the network request. For example, a request that includesa file-sharing or file-distribution protocol may be suspicious.

In some implementations, the network activity may be identified based onthe timing of the network request. For example, for a user that usuallyworks during 8 am-6 pm business hours, a network request that takesplace outside of these (or other) normal business hours may be unusual,and may thus be indicative of a potential or actual compromise.

In some implementations, the network activity may be identified based onhistorical patterns of behavior associated with the device, user, orprocess. For example, for a user that usually works during 8 am-6 pmbusiness hours, a network request that takes place outside of these (orother) normal business hours may be indicative of compromise. Likewise,a file transfer protocol (FTP) request from a device or process thatthat does not usually use FTP protocol may be indicative of a potentialor actual compromise.

A network request may be detected based on context. For example, apattern of connections to a single resource, an unusual sequence ofdestination addresses, or some other network activity (or other endpointbehavior) may be indicative of potential compromise of the endpoint. Forexample, a number of suspicious network requests meeting a thresholdnumber of network requests may be indicative of potential or actualcompromise.

In some implementations, a response to the network request may bemonitored and included in a determination of potential or actualsecurity risk. For example, if a network request is an authenticationrequest to another device, and the response to the authenticationrequest is that the authentication request is determined to have failed,for example by monitoring a response to the request, the activity may bedetermined to be indicative of a potential or actual security risk. Insome implementations, a pattern of failed authentication requests, suchas more than a threshold number of failed authentication requests, maybe indicative of a potential or actual security risk.

As shown in step 805, once potentially harmful network traffic isdetected, other steps may be taken to provide additional context forevaluation or to reach a conclusion on further action before evaluatinguser presence. For example, the method 800 may include requesting areputation of an application on an endpoint that initiated the networkrequest. This may permit direct blacklist or whitelist determinations orthe like without requiring additional queries to the endpoint. This mayalso be particularly useful for identifying circumstances where humanpresence may be highly relevant to the detection of a security risk. Forexample, where a connection is opened to a remote location of low orunknown reputation and an upload of data from the endpoint to the remotelocation is initiated, this pattern would suggest malicious data leakageor exfiltration, and it may be highly advantageous to determine whethera human user is controlling the activity by the endpoint. Similarly,certain protocols that are commonly used to download malware (e.g., peernetworking protocols) or upload sensitive data (e.g., a file or datatransfer protocol) may provide useful context for an initial decisionwhether to test for the presence of a human user.

As shown in step 806, the method 800 may include evaluating a status ofthe endpoint to determine whether a user is present at the endpoint, orwhether an authorized user is present at the endpoint. In particular, ifthere is a reason to suspect the network request potentially poses asecurity risk, or if there are other indicia of compromise for theendpoint, then a procedure may be initiated to evaluate whether a humanuser is present on the endpoint and/or whether a human user initiatedthe network request. For example, the status may include reviewinginformation communicated by the endpoint. The information communicatedby the endpoint may include information associated with the request. Theinformation communicated by the endpoint may include informationassociated with processes other than the process that generated therequest. The information communicated by the endpoint may includeinformation about user activity on the endpoint. The informationcommunicated by the endpoint may include information communicated inresponse to a request. For example, evaluating the status may includequerying the endpoint about whether the user is present. Evaluating thestatus may include transmitting a request to the endpoint for a userinput.

For example, a request for user input may be presented as a pop-upwindow or other notification with text requesting a response. This mayinclude a simple request such as “click here to continue,” or a moreinstructive narrative such as: “A potential security issue has beendetected. Please click here to confirm that you requested the followingnetwork activity.” This may also or instead include other user inputbesides clicking, e.g., typing characters into a text box, entering orotherwise providing authentication credentials, answering a securityinquiry of information known to the user, or the like. In anotheraspect, a blocking page may be presented in a web browser that requireshuman interaction before further network activity can be undertaken.

In another aspect, the presence of a human user may be inferred fromendpoint activity or status. For example, information about useractivity or user presence may be included in a secure heartbeat from theendpoint, and evaluating the status may include examining the secureheartbeat from the endpoint for information about whether the user ispresent. The status of the endpoint may include other state informationor historical activity indicative of user presence. For example, thestatus may include whether a user is logged in to the endpoint (whichsuggests that a human user is presently using the endpoint) or whether adisplay of the endpoint is displaying a screen saver or is “locked”(which suggests that a human user is not presently using the endpoint).The status may also or instead include other information useful forinferring whether the user is present. For example, the status mayinclude a record of keyboard or mouse activity within a predeterminedtime window such as a prior minute, a prior five minutes, a prior tenminutes, and so forth.

In another aspect, the presence of a human user may be inferred fromactivity or status on another endpoint. For example, the informationabout user activity or user presence may be included in a secureheartbeat from the other endpoint, and evaluating the status may includeexamining the secure heartbeat from the other endpoint for informationabout whether the user is present. The status of the other endpoint mayinclude other state information or historical activity indicative ofuser presence.

In another aspect, the inquiry may include evaluating whether a user waspresent when the application that generated the network request waslaunched, which may be relevant in a number ofcircumstances—particularly where a user might initiate a large onlinebackup or other lengthy download or upload procedure—where a user mightintentionally initiate network activity and then log out from anendpoint.

For example, a historical record of user activity on the endpoint may beexamined to determine when the user that initiated the request lastauthenticated to the endpoint, the state of the user's session, one ormore processes that were in operation when the network request wasinitiated, whether the request was initiated as a result of userinteraction, and whether the user authorized or directed the networkrequest.

In another aspect, the inquiry may simply include verifying the intentof a user that is known to be present. For example, this method 800 maybe usefully employed to prevent a pfishing attack where alegitimate-appearing electronic mail communication contains a link to amalicious site. In this use case, the application may be an electronicmail client (e.g., of presumed unsafe reputation), and the networkrequest coming from the application may be addressed to a location ofunknown reputation. In this context, even though a user is known to bepresent because of the manual link navigation, remediation may beappropriately undertaken, such as by directing the endpoint to present apop-up window or blocking page that explicitly identifies the targetpage and requests confirmation of the navigation instruction. Forexample, the notification may state: “You have requested access to[website]. Are you certain that you wish to navigate to this potentiallyunsafe network location?”

This and other techniques may be used to evaluate whether a user ispresent, or whether a user intended to initiate a particular networkrequest.

As shown in step 808, when a user is determined to be present in step806, other processing may be performed. This may include returning tostep 804 where additional network requests may be detected. Of course,other processing, rules, or decision logic may be applied in thiscontext. For example, where a destination address is blacklisted orwhitelisted, a decision on forwarding the network flow may be maderegardless of whether a user is present. All such existing techniquesfor conditionally forwarding traffic, including those describedelsewhere herein may be used in addition to or instead of detecting userpresence, and a method may provide various types of threat detection andsecurity management, either concurrently, sequentially, or in some otherorder or manner, all without departing from the scope of thisdisclosure. Thus, it should be appreciated that the techniques describedwith reference to FIG. 8 (and the other figures in this disclosure) maybe intended for use either alone or in combination with other techniquesfor managing network flows and protecting against security threats in anenterprise network.

As shown in step 810, where it is determined in step 806 that no user ispresent, the method 800 may include remediation. This may include anyresponse or remediation suitable to the circumstances. For example, whenno user is detected at the endpoint, this may include executing asecurity measure in response to the network request such as blocking thenetwork request, initiating a scan or remediation of the endpoint,blacklisting the destination address, updating a reputation of thedestination address, or any other suitable action. It will be understoodthat the remediation may be contextually selected based, for example, onother available information such as a reputation of the destinationaddress for the network request, or a reputation of an application onthe endpoint making the request.

In other circumstances, no remediation may be required. For example,where both the endpoint application and the remote location areupdaters, then an endpoint that automatically requests a downloadwithout a user present may be a part of a legitimate, periodic softwareupdating protocol. Similarly, where the endpoint application and theremote location both have a known, good reputation, then the activitymay be permitted even in the absence of a human user of the endpoint.

When the remediation has been initiated or completed, the method 800 mayreturn to step 804 where a next network request may be detected. Ingeneral, this method 810 may be repeated indefinitely so long as anendpoint is active or powered on, or so long as the endpoint isconnected to a data network or is otherwise generating network requests.

According to the foregoing, there is disclosed herein a system forverifying user presence associated with network flows. In one aspect,the system may include a network device including a network interfaceconfigured to couple in a communicating relationship with a data networkthat includes an endpoint, a memory on the network device, and aprocessor on the network device. The processor may be configured toexecute instructions stored in the memory to perform the steps ofconnecting an endpoint to the network device through the networkinterface, detecting a network request by a process executing on theendpoint to a remote resource that presents a potential security risk,evaluating a status of the endpoint to determine whether a user ispresent at the endpoint, and executing a security measure in response tothe network request when no user is detected at the endpoint. Thenetwork device may be any physical or virtual network device includingwithout limitation a firewall, a gateway, a threat management facility,or the like.

In complementary fashion, a system may include an endpoint configured toprovide information about user present to such a network device, forexample, by including user presence information in a secure heartbeat orother communication to the network device. In one aspect, the system mayinclude an endpoint including a network interface configured to couplethe endpoint in a communicating relationship with a data network, amemory on the endpoint, and a processor on the endpoint. The processormay be configured to execute instructions stored in the memory toperform the steps of monitoring a status of the endpoint, periodicallycreating a status indicator characterizing the status, generating a userpresence indicator containing an indication of whether a human user ispresent at the endpoint, creating a heartbeat containing the statusindicator and the user presence indicator, and transmitting theheartbeat through the network interface to a gateway that couples theendpoint to a data network.

Described herein are techniques for securing a mobile device againstmalware, e.g., through a behavioral analysis of events to detect andidentify unexpected behaviors/events. This may be accomplishedseparately or in addition to the techniques described herein. To thisend, the techniques described herein may be specifically tailored formobile devices such as mobile phones (e.g., smart phones, cellularphones, and so on), tablets, personal digital assistants (PDAs),wearable mobile devices (e.g., smartwatches and the like), and so forth.These mobile devices may, for example, be the endpoints, client devices,or computing devices discussed with reference to the figures above.

A mobile device may be distinguishable from a non-mobile computingdevice through the inclusion of certain characteristics. Thesecharacteristics may include, for example, an operating systemspecifically configured for mobile use (e.g., ANDROID®, iOS®, WINDOWS®PHONE, BLACKBERRY®, and the like), messaging capabilities (e.g., shortmessage service (SMS) messages and multimedia messages (MMS)),telephone/videophone capabilities, contact or phonebook storage, aninterface or association with a mobile carrier and a billing account,camera access, microphone access and audio recording capabilities, datausage capabilities and limitations, a subscriber identity module (SIM)card, mobile online browsing capabilities and limitations, one or moremobile applications, a short-range communications protocol (e.g.,Bluetooth and the like), a wireless communications protocol (e.g.,Wi-Fi, cellular network, and so on), cellular network limitations (e.g.,roaming, limits on minutes of usage or messages sent/received, and thelike), and so forth. Also, mobile devices and their operating systemsmay generally contain a plurality of personally identifiableinformation, private information, and information users of the mobiledevices would typically want control over (and to know whether themobile device and information included therein is being used asexpected). In addition, the smart phone or other device will typicallycouple to a network through a cellular network and cellular serviceprovider. This may present particular vulnerabilities different fromother computing devices where, for example, the smart phone canauthorize charges to an account maintained by the service provider for auser of the smart phone. More generally, applications that install on asmart phone can be authorized for a suite of activity including use of acamera, a microphone, a location service (e.g., GPS), a contactsresource (e.g., a directory or other data resource containing owner andthird party personal information), a messaging service, an emailservice, a phone service, and so forth. As such, a mobile device mayhave specific vulnerabilities with regard to malware. For example, amobile application may send an SMS message without a user's knowledge toa premium rate service, which could charge a billing account of a userthereby unknowingly costing the user money. By way of example, suchapplications may include malware and games that use SMS as a paymentservice to access extra content. A mobile device may also be susceptibleto applications that have access to resources and use such permissionsto violate privacy conventions or policy. For example, an applicationthat has permission to access a user's address book information and tothe internet may send a copy of the user's address book information toanother device, such as a server. For example, an application that haspermission to access a user's GPS may communicate the user's location toanother device, such as a server.

Implementations may use techniques that account for expected eventsinitiated by a user (even if to a premium service) to identify eventsthat are not initiated by the user (even if the same type of event wasonce previously initiated by the user) and for informing the user thatthese events are occurring. An identified event that is not initiated bythe user may be further analyzed or filtered to determine whether theevent is unexpected and potentially unauthorized. To this end,implementations may include the detection of unexpected events occurringwithout specific user interaction in mobile devices, such as makingphone calls, accessing or making changes to the contacts/phone book,accessing user habits such as browser settings/history and othercommunication logs, accessing files, accessing the camera or microphone,and so forth. In this manner, implementations may analyze specificruntime events relative to patterns of expected user input/interaction,or relative to generalized background behavior occurring without userinput/interaction, to determine if events are expected or unexpected andauthorized or potentially malicious.

Techniques described herein may further assist in warning a user when anapplication (or other function/service) is using information (e.g.,personally identifiable information or private information) out ofcontext, e.g., in a manner that is unrelated to the user'sinput/interaction or is otherwise occurring unexpectedly. This mayprovide a user of a mobile device with information on what events arebeing executed on their mobile device.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of a method for securing a mobile device againstpotential or actual compromise, such as malware. As discussed herein,‘malware’ may refer to a virus, a worm, spam, a phishing exploration,spyware, adware, Trojans, an intrusion, a policy abuse, an uncontrolledaccess, an unwanted application, a malicious application, a potentiallyun-wanted application (PUAs), an unwanted behavior (e.g., of anapplication), a behavior that is noncompliant with a policy (e.g., asecurity policy or a corporate policy), and so forth.

The method 900 may be specifically tailored for use with mobile devices.This is because mobile operating systems may include security features,events, and user interactions that are specific to mobile devices ascompared to other non-mobile computing devices and systems as generallydescribed herein, as well as due to the exposure of a device to abillable account of a device owner. The method 900 may be used incoordination with a gateway or other network device.

The method 900 may implement behavioral monitoring and analysis for themobile device. For example, through monitoring the mobile device forexecuted events, and then comparing the executed events against expecteduser interaction patterns for the mobile device, the method 900 maydetect unexpected and anomalous events. Detecting such unexpected eventsmay be used to detect malware such as malicious applications, PUAs, andother applications that may not be intended as malware/PUAs but areexecuting events outside of the expectations of the user of the mobiledevice.

As shown in step 902, the method 900 may include monitoring a pluralityof events executed on a mobile device. Events included in the pluralityof events may include events commonly executed on a mobile device, e.g.,where monitoring or security functionality on the mobile device (e.g., amonitoring or security application installed on the mobile device) isconfigured to set a callback to receive a notification that such eventshave been executed. The events may include without limitation acommunication such as sending or receiving a message (e.g., a SMS, aMMS, an instant message, a chat message, an email message, a web pagerequest, a download request, an upload request, etc.), accessing aresource, making or receiving a phone call or video call, accessing orchanging SIM card data, accessing or changing contact or phonebookinformation, accessing Internet browsing history or other user activity,making a URL request, accessing or changing files or other data storedin a memory of the user device or otherwise accessible through themobile device (e.g., data stored in a cloud account of the user),accessing and using a camera of the mobile device, accessing and using amicrophone of the mobile device, connecting to an external device ornetwork (e.g., via Bluetooth or WiFi), accessing data from anotherdevice or generally through a network, and so forth. Events may beassociated with applications installed and running on the mobile device.Other types of conventional events in the context of a mobile device,such as events related to user input (button events, touch events),executing programs, and so forth, are also intended to fall within thescope of “events” as that term is used herein to the extent that theymight be used to assist in detecting (or confirming the absence of)activity indicative of potential or actual compromise.

Monitoring a plurality of events executed on a mobile device may beperformed by a monitoring or security application installed on themobile device as referenced above, or such monitoring or securityfunctionality may be executed by a processor and a memory include on themobile device. A software component such as an event handler may be usedto detect and dispose of events occurring on the device. Mobile devicehardware and operating system software may include functionality tomonitor events, and may provide an interface for security functionalityto monitor events. A record (e.g., log) of events may be generated, andmonitoring or security functionality may monitor the record.

As shown in step 904, the method 900 may include detecting a first eventin the plurality of events. The first event may be any event includingevents listed herein or otherwise known in the art, which may occur whena user is interacting with a device or an application or when a user isnot interacting with the mobile device or not interacting with anapplication that generated the event. The first event may be abackground event, such that it is initiated by a process that is notrunning in the foreground of the mobile device. The first event may bedetected using data or behavior associated with the event such ascontext or comparison with historical record of events. In general,mobile devices may be expected to execute events in the background, sonot all such background events may be of interest to a user or to amonitoring or security application, and not all background events may beindicative of potential or actual compromise.

The first event may be an unexpected event, in that it takes place at atime, or with a destination, that is different from historical eventsassociated with the device. The first event may be an unexpected event,in that it takes place at a time, or with a destination, that isdifferent from historical events associated with the user of the device.The unexpected event may be generated by an application executing on themobile device while a user of the mobile device is not interacting withthe application.

In an aspect, a monitoring or security application may be used to detectevents sourced from an application that are generally unexpected whenthe user of the mobile device is not interacting with the application.For example, the monitoring or security application may register acontent observer/call back to monitor for predetermined events on themobile device (e.g., any of the events recited above). The monitoring orsecurity application may detect any such event and log the event. Thus,the monitoring or security application may generate a record of events,including, for example, one or more of: times of events, resources ordestinations associated with events, frequency of repeated events, anduser interactions associated with the events. The monitoring or securityapplication may determine if the event is linked to a specific userinteraction with the mobile device, and classify the event as anunexpected event when the event is not found to be linked to a specificuser interaction with the mobile device.

Some examples of unexpected events include the use of a camera ormicrophone of the mobile device, sending messages, making phone calls,making purchases, uploading data, downloading data, incurring charges toa user's billing account, and so forth, e.g., outside of previous times,destinations, or frequencies of historical patterns. That is, theaforementioned events may typically only take place when a user isinteracting with the mobile device, so if these events are occurringoutside of patterns of historical usage, they may be identified asunexpected events.

An application that generated the first event may control a tool of themobile device, for example, a camera of the mobile device or amicrophone of the mobile device. The application that generated thefirst event may also or instead include one or more of the following: acommunication application, a phone application, an instant messagingapplication, and the like. A reputation of the application thatgenerated the event may be considered. In an aspect, the reputation maybe a positive reputation, a negative reputation, or an unknownreputation. In an aspect, behavior that is unexpected may be permittedfor applications with a known good reputation. Behavior that isunexpected may be flagged for applications that have a negativereputation or an unknown reputation.

A reputation of a resource or destination of the first event may beconsidered. For example, the first event may include sending an instantmessage, e.g., where the application includes an instant messagingapplication. This may include sending or receiving the instant message(although sending an instant message without user interaction istypically more unexpected than receiving an instant message without userinteraction). The instant message may include one or more of a SMSmessage, a MMS, a chat message, and the like. The instant message mayincur a charge to a user of the mobile device. The instant message maybe directed to a destination with an associated reputation or an unknownreputation. In an aspect, behavior that is unexpected may be permittedfor a destination with a known good reputation. Behavior that isunexpected may be flagged for a destination that has a negativereputation or an unknown reputation.

The first event may include a phone call, e.g., where the applicationincludes a phone capability. This may include making or receiving thephone call (although making a phone call without user interaction istypically more unexpected than receiving a phone call without userinteraction). This may also or instead include answering the phone call,which would be quite unexpected without user interaction with the mobiledevice. The phone call may incur a charge to a user of the mobiledevice.

In an aspect, a communication event that occurs without a specific userinteraction may be classified as unexpected. In an aspect, events thatincur a charge to a user of the mobile device without a specific userinteraction may generally be classified as unexpected.

The first event may include a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) request.

The first event may include access to one or more of a browsing history,personal contacts, and a communications log on the mobile device.

The first event may also or instead include one or more of: accessing orchanging data (e.g., SIM card data, stored contacts, or stored files),accessing a web browsing history or other usage data of a user,accessing a camera, accessing a microphone and/or recording audio, andso forth.

As shown in step 906, the method 900 may include evaluating the firstevent in a context of the mobile device to determine whether the firstevent is potentially unauthorized. To this end, attributes of events onmobile devices may provide the context that can be utilized to determinewhether the first event was legitimate and expected, or unexpected andpotentially malicious. For example, evaluating the first event in acontext of the mobile device may result in a determination as to whethera user of the mobile device has explicitly allowed or initiated thefirst event. For example, an event that triggered the first event may bereviewed to see whether the user initiated or authorized the firstevent.

The context may include one or more other events functionally associatedwith the event currently being evaluated. For example, the detection ofseveral linked events (or events that are otherwise functionallyassociated with the event) may provide further context as to whether thefirst event is expected, or whether the first event is potentiallyunauthorized. Also, linked events (or events that are otherwisefunctionally associated with the event) may provide context for aseverity of the behavior of an unexpected event.

In an aspect, an order of events or a pattern of events may be used toevaluate an event to determine whether it is potentially unauthorized.This may occur for first events as well as for events associated with auser interaction. For example, a user of the mobile device may haveexplicitly initiated (through a user interaction) the playing of a game.During game play, and while the user is interacting with the game, anevent (e.g., an event associated with the user's accepting to play thegame or the user's interaction with the game) may be collecting datafrom the mobile device and posting the data on a third-party website.This event may be expected or unexpected depending upon, e.g., thereputation of the game, the amount and type of data collected, and soforth. To identify unexpected events in this context, techniques maymonitor for a pattern including each of (i) the reading of SIM card dataor accessing files/data with specific extensions/locations, and (ii)requesting a URL transaction that includes such data (e.g., to a retaildigital subscriber line (DSL) connection or the like).

The context may include one or more other events temporally associatedwith the event. For example, the timing and frequency of the event inconnection with associated events may be used to determine whether thefirst event is expected, or whether the first event is potentiallyunauthorized. This may include, for example, whether the first event isassociated with an application that was recently installed on the mobiledevice, whether the first event has been historically executed atcertain times (and a comparison of these historically executed timesversus the executed time of the detected first event), whether the firstevent has been historically executed at certain intervals (and acomparison of these historically executed intervals versus an intervalrelated to the detected background and, e.g., a previous event orscheduled future event), and so forth.

Events occurring in close temporal proximity to one another may becompared or otherwise analyzed to determine if a pattern formed by theseevents can be classified as unexpected behavior or to determine whetherthe first events are potentially unauthorized. Some examples includewithout limitation an application, process, or service that sendsmultiple messages (e.g., SMS or MMS) in close temporal proximity,receives or accesses multiple messages in close temporal proximity,accesses a web browser history and performs a URL request/transaction inclose temporal proximity, and so forth. Such patterns of events thattake place in the background they may be particularly suspicious. Inanother aspect, a pattern formed by events occurring in close temporalproximity that can be classified as an unexpected and potentiallyunauthorized behavior includes (i) accessing SIM card data or accessingfiles with specific extensions or locations, and (ii) performing a URLrequest/transaction.

Some events, regardless of whether they are first events or areotherwise associated with a user interaction, may be identified asunexpected or determined to be potentially unauthorized when the eventsare detected at a frequency that is unexpected. To this end, thefrequency or repetition of one or more events may be used for comparisonto acceptable ranges for a determination as to whether the events areunexpected or potentially unauthorized. By way of example, events thatinclude the sending of messages (e.g., SMS or MMS), the making of phonecalls, or the making of URL requests at a rate beyond a predeterminedthreshold may be identified as unexpected or potentially unauthorized.

Similarly, events otherwise including unexpected timing characteristicsmay be identified as unexpected or potentially unauthorized, whetherfirst events or events associated with a user interaction. To this end,when an event is detected, the timing of the event may be compared to ahistory of the event. The history may include information such as datathat is transmitted or received, a destination for data, specific inputsor outputs, and so forth. The history may also or instead include timingdata related to events, e.g., for a specific mobile device or for aplurality of mobile devices, such as when events typically occur (e.g.,time of day or otherwise), an event frequency (e.g., how often an eventtypically occurs), when events previously occurred (e.g., the last timean event occurred), when events are scheduled to occur (e.g., the nexttime an event will occur), and other characteristics of events. Theevent may be identified as unexpected or potentially unauthorized whenthe timing of the event deviates from the history by a predeterminedamount. By way of example, an event that includes sending a message(e.g., SMS or MMS) at an abnormal time may be identified as unexpectedor potentially unauthorized—e.g., messages being sent at a time thathistorically is associated with a specified period of user inactivity(e.g., a relatively long period of user inactivity).

The context may include a history of recent user interactions with themobile device generally, and the temporal relationship between the eventand these user interactions. The context may also or instead include ahistory of recent user interactions with the application that generatedthe event, and the temporal relationship between the event and theseuser interactions. In other words, an identifiable link between a firstevent and a user interaction may assist in determining whether the eventis expected (e.g., because the user initiated/responded to a userinterface request or provided permission) or whether the event isunexpected or potentially unauthorized (e.g., because there was norecent user interaction with the application that generated the event,or more generally with the mobile device).

User interactions related to an event may be used to determine whetheran event is unexpected or potentially unauthorized. For example, adetermination may be made regarding whether the associated userinteractions are expected or unexpected, which can then be used foridentifying the event. Expected user interactions may be based onhistoric user interactions. In this manner, because mobile devices aretypically integrated into the lives of their users, expected userinteractions may provide a guidepost for detecting unexpected eventexecution.

The context may include the initiation of the event, e.g., whether theevent was initiated by an application on the mobile device or by a userof the mobile device. If it can be determined which applicationinitiated, generated, or executed the event, the reputation of theapplication may be used for context as explained below, or otherinformation regarding the application may be used for context (e.g.,whether the application complies with a security policy, whether theapplication is on a whitelist or blacklist, and so on).

If identification of the application that initiated the event is notdeterministically possible, a heuristic approach may be used, e.g.,through data patterns and the like. This may include registering acontent observer/call back that monitors which applications are runningor have run on the mobile device (e.g., in addition to monitoring forevents as described herein). This may also or instead include acomparison between a time that the event was detected with one or moretimes that one or more applications were running (or started to run) tofind matching times or times that are relatively close. Using thistechnique, the closest match may be the application that generated theevent. Reputation data may also or instead be used to identify theapplication, e.g., further to the heuristic approach described above.For example, identifying the application that initiated the event mayinclude excluding applications having trusted reputations whenperforming the comparison/analysis of the detected event times withapplications that were running at that time. In this manner, the closestmatch that is not excluded may be identified as the application thatgenerated the event. Installation data for applications may also orinstead be used to identify the application that initiated the event,e.g., further to the heuristic approaches described above. For example,identifying the application may include comparing the installation ageof the applications that were running at a time that the event wasdetected (or applications that are relatively close matches in time),where the application with the youngest installation age may beidentified as the application that generated the event. This techniquemay be based on the theory that, because the detected first event isnew, the latest installed application relative to the time of the eventis likely the application that generated the event.

The context may include a time of the first event. For example, even ifthe first event is an expected event or otherwise is associated with anexpected behavior, the first event may occur at one or more of a time, afrequency, or a pattern that is unexpected. For example, it may beexpected that a user of a mobile device sends and receives text messagesbetween the hours of 8 am and 10 pm, where text messages sent orreceived outside of this timeframe would be unexpected. As such, if afirst event was detected as sending one or more text messages at around3 am, this may be context that the first event is potentiallyunauthorized, particularly if the user has not interacted with thedevice for a certain period of time (e.g., a number of hours). Thus, ahistory of runtime events (e.g., a history that illustrates the commonruntimes of events) for a specific user device, or for mobiledevices/platforms generally, may be used as contextual information forevaluating the first event.

As referenced above, the context may include a reputation of anapplication that generated the event. In general, reputation may belocally evaluated by a device using any of a number of rules, tools,signatures, behaviors, data or control relationships, network flows, andso forth, or reputation may be evaluated by a remote threat managementfacility and reported to the mobile device, or some combination ofthese. The reputation of the application may be based on one or more ofa popularity of the application, a reputation of a provider of theapplication, and an installed base of the application among a populationof users (e.g., the number of users or customers of the application).The popularity of the application may be determined through itspopularity in a particular application store, e.g., based on a number ofdownloads, ratings from users, and the like. The provider of anapplication may include a publisher of the application, an author of theapplication, an installer of the application, and so forth, where theprovider may be further weighted based on whether the provider istrusted, untrusted, or unknown. The number of applications published orauthored, and a length of time for providing applications may also orinstead be used in considering the provider of an application. Otherfactors may also or instead be used as a basis for an application'sreputation, including without limitation, a time of installation of theapplication, an age of the application, information concerning an updateto the application (e.g., timing, source, and so on), associative dataregarding the application (e.g., whether the application was publishedby an author/publisher having one or more other associated applicationsor reputations), a type of the application (e.g., a game, a financialapplication, a messaging or electronic mail application, a shoppingapplication, an information provider application, a social mediaapplication, and the like), and so forth. The reputation may also orinstead include information from whitelists/blacklists, detectedsignatures, information from data patterns, and so forth.

A reputation of an application that generated the event may relate tothe trustworthiness of the application or an attribute thereof. Thereputation may be retrieved from one or more lists of known reputationsfor applications—e.g., lists of known sources of malware or knownsuspicious events, lists of known safe or trusted resources or events,and so on. Reputations may be stored in a memory, database, or datastore, such as any of those as described herein. A reputation of anapplication that generated the event may be expressed in any suitable oruseful level of granularity such as with discrete categories (e.g.,trusted, untrusted, unknown, malicious, safe, etc.) or with a numericalscore or other quantitative indicator. The reputation may also orinstead be scaled, e.g., based on any of the attributes or context ofthe application or event referenced above. The reputation may include orotherwise lead to a binary output (e.g., ‘run’ and ‘don't run’, or‘warn’ and ‘don't warn’) or a weighted output describing whether theapplication or event is within an expected range for making a decisionregarding running/stopping an application or event, or for warning auser of the mobile device of the application or event.

The reputation of an application associated with an event may be used inaggregate and/or weighted with any of the other context informationrecited herein or otherwise known in the art to produce a usefulclassification of the event or application. For example, an unknownapplication executing a particular type of event (e.g., accessingcontact data in the mobile device) may lead to a determination that thatthe event is unexpected, and further that the application is potentiallymalicious. Similarly, a known application having a relativelygood/clean/high reputation that is executing events beyond a scope ofhistoric events related to the application may lead to a similardetermination that the event is unexpected. However, in this use case,the warning presented to the user of the mobile device may be differentthan that of a warning for a known malicious application (e.g., thelatter warning for the known malicious application would be moresevere).

As discussed above, the time of the installation of the applicationand/or an age of the application may be used for contextual purposes(e.g., using reputations or otherwise) to determine whether an event ispotentially unauthorized. This may be useful if there is no priorhistory of the event—e.g., the age of an application associated with theevent can be used to reduce the set of possible offending applicationsto those installed after the event was detected.

Reputation data (or any of the context information provided herein), inaddition to being used to provide context for a determination as towhether an event is potentially unauthorized, may also or instead beused to directly identify whether the first event is unexpected, e.g.,further to the techniques described above such as the temporal eventanalysis or analysis on the order of events/pattern of events. To thisend, reputations of applications associated with the event (e.g.,applications that are specifically identified or heuristicallyidentified as associated with the event) may be taken into account toexclude a first event that is generated from a trusted application asbeing identified as unexpected. Thus, in an aspect, to determine whetherthe first event is unexpected, an application associated with the eventmay first be identified (using any of the techniques described herein),and a reputation of that application may be analyzed, where, if thatapplication is trusted, the first event is not identified as unexpected.

The context may include inputs or outputs associated with the firstevent. The inputs or outputs may include communications protocols and/ortransmitted data or received data associated with the event. Similarly,the context may include a destination of transmitted data. By way ofexample, the destination number of an SMS message or a phone callassociated with the event can be used for context. This can also orinstead include an evaluation of a link or lack thereof between thedestination number and known malicious/unwanted numbers, whether thedestination number is included in the contacts/phonebook of a mobiledevice, a length of time the destination number has been included in thecontacts/phonebook of a mobile device, a message history or a phone callhistory of a mobile device (e.g., a history of sending messages ormaking calls to the exact destination number, a history of sendingmessages or making calls to similar destination numbers, a history ofsending messages or making calls to destination numbers with the samecountry code as the destination number, and so on), whether a countrycode of the destination number is the same as that of a mobile device,whether a mobile device is currently roaming, whether the destinationnumber is the same or similar to a number associated with a paymentservice (e.g., a premium rate service number), and so forth. As anotherexample, a destination of a URL or other web traffic (e.g., adestination address) associated with the event can be used for context.This may also or instead include whether the destination address is atrusted site or a known malicious/infected site (e.g., included in awhitelist/blacklist), whether information transmitted to the destinationaddress includes identifiable data (such as an Internet Protocol (IP)address, an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, aphone number, a mobile service provider code, and the like), whether thedestination address is a known dynamic Domain Name System (DNS) serviceor a non-corporate Internet service host (e.g., a home DSL connection),and so forth.

The context may include a location of data accessed by the event. Forexample, the context may include a determination as to whether filesaccessed by the event are located in default locations such as cameraimages. The context may also or instead include the extensions of filesthat are accessed, e.g., whether the accessed files are text/worddocuments, presentations, images, videos, and so forth. The context mayalso or instead include whether any accessed data is deemed to besensitive, e.g., identifiable data such as an IP address, an IMEInumber, a phone number, a mobile service provider code, and so on.

The context may include activity on, or the status of, another endpoint.For example, information about user activity or user presence may beincluded in a secure heartbeat from another endpoint or a gateway, andevaluating the context may include examining the secure heartbeat fromanother endpoint or gateway for context about the user, the network, orotherwise. The secure heartbeat may include other status information,historical activity, current activity information, user presenceinformation, or any other suitable information.

Evaluating the first event in a context of the mobile device may includecombining or weighting the detection of the first event with the contextor a factor related to the context.

It will be understood that a variety of techniques are available fordetecting user interaction, or more generally determining whether a useris currently using or interacting with a mobile device. In one aspect,user interaction may be directly detected or measured based on, e.g.,button pushes, touch events or other touch screen interactions, and soforth. In another aspect, user interaction may be inferred based onwhether a mobile device is screen locked or active. For example, amobile device may be configured to automatically lock after a period ofnon-use and present a lock screen requiring a biometric activation(e.g., facial image, thumbprint, or the like), passcode, PIN, or otherinput for further use. When the mobile device becomes locked, areasonable inference may arise that the user is not interacting with themobile device. Similarly, if a user input has been received within arecent window of several seconds or minutes, a reasonable inference mayarise that a user is interacting with the mobile device even where aparticular event is not explicitly linked to a user interaction. Inanother aspect, where media such as a video is playing, user interactionmay be inferred even during prolonged periods without a user input.These or any other techniques suitable for explicitly or implicitlydetermining whether a user is interacting with a mobile device may beusefully employed to identify user interaction as contemplated herein.Thus in general, detection of user interaction may be based on time,input events, device status, or some combination of these. Where userinteraction is uncertain and highly relevant, user presence may beconfirmed, such as by presenting a window requesting confirmation ofactive use (e.g., “Your device is trying to transmit an unexpected SMSmessage. Can you confirm that you wish to send this?”) or by using acamera for facial recognition or tracking of eye movements.

As shown in step 908, the method 900 may include determining whether thefirst event is authorized, which can occur through the evaluation of thefirst event as recited in step 906 above. In an aspect, if the event isdetermined to be authorized, the method 900 may proceed to step 910, andif the event is determined to be unauthorized or potentiallyunauthorized, the method 900 may proceed to step 912.

Where an event is authorized, the method 900 may return to step 902where monitoring may continue for further events. In general, this willinclude taking no further action for securing the mobile device againstthe particular first event if the first event is determined to beauthorized, e.g., through the evaluation of the first event. In anotheraspect, a user notification may be provided notifying the user that thefirst event occurred or is occurring, such as where a determination isuncertain and a record may be useful. The notification may be lessintrusive or severe than a notification for an unauthorized first event.The particular first event may also or instead be recorded, e.g., in alog in a memory of the mobile device to provide context for subsequentanalysis of other events.

As shown in step 912, when the first event is a potentially unauthorizedevent (or if the first event is confirmed as being unauthorized), aremedial action may be taken. This may, for example, include presentinga warning to the user on the mobile device that the potentiallyunauthorized event has occurred, and requesting user confirmation thatthe potentially unauthorized event be allowed to continue. The warningmay include a notification sent to the user on the mobile device (orotherwise) that an unexpected, and potentially unauthorized, event hasoccurred. The notification may be sent to the user using one or more ofa message (e.g., SMS message), an email, a push notification, an audionoise, a vibration, a visual alert (e.g., as a pop-up message on adisplay of the mobile device or on a light or the like included on themobile device), and the like. The warning may include informationregarding the specific event such as event attributes, an applicationthat generated the event, when the event occurred, and so forth. Thewarning may supply the user with an option for stopping the event orterminating an application that generated the event. The warning mayalso or instead supply the user with an option for uninstalling orotherwise removing an application that generated the event from themobile device.

The warning may be used or aggregated with static information todetermine a classification for an application associated with the event.For example, static information may include a set of resources in whichan application is allowed to access, e.g., resources typicallyassociated with an additional cost to the user of the mobile device.

The severity of the warning may be related to the level/severity of thefirst event, e.g., the maliciousness of the event. The maliciousness ofthe first event may be determined based on a reputation of theapplication that generated the event. For example, if the reputation ofthe application that generated the event is ‘untrusted’ or the like, thewarning may include multiple notifications where each notificationincludes one or more sensory warnings (e.g., a vibration, a flashing oflight, and the like). Similarly, if the reputation of the applicationthat generated the event is ‘unknown’ or the like, the warning mayinclude a single notification without any additional sensory warnings.To alert a user to a risk posed by the first event, the warnings mayalso or instead include a numerical score, a color-coded indicator(e.g., red is high severity, yellow is medium severity, and green is lowseverity), or other quantitative indicator.

Remediation may include any response or remediation suitable to thecircumstances. For example, this may include executing a securitymeasure in response to the network request such as blocking theactivity, initiating a scan or remediation of the mobile device,blacklisting an application or destination address, updating areputation of the application or destination address, or any othersuitable action. It will be understood that the remediation may becontextually selected based, for example, on other available informationsuch as a reputation.

In other circumstances, no remediation may be required. For example,where an application or a remote location are known updaters, then amobile device that automatically requests a download without a userpresent may be a part of a legitimate, periodic software updatingprotocol. Similarly, where an application and a resource or remotelocation both have a known, good reputation, then the activity may bepermitted even in the absence of other context.

When remediation has been initiated or completed, the method may berepeated.

In an aspect, a detected unexpected event that is determined to beunauthorized (or potentially unauthorized) may be automatically stoppedfrom executing/running on the mobile device. In another aspect, anapplication that generated an unexpected event that is determined to beunauthorized (or potentially unauthorized) may be automatically removedfrom the mobile device.

Other remedial actions may also or instead be taken. For example,cellular radio and other communications hardware (e.g., radios forBluetooth, WiFi, etc.) may be deactivated to prevent further networkcommunications to and from the device. In another aspect, communicationsmay be restricted to exclusive communications with a threat managementfacility so that a compromised condition can be remediated beforerestoring other network communications. In another aspect, all servicesor applications may be suspended except for a local remediation agent orsimilar program until the device has been adequately remediated. Moregenerally, any techniques for suspending operation of the device and orinitiating remediation may be usefully performed in step 912.

The method 900 described above may be implemented by a computer programproduct for securing a mobile device against malware, where the computerprogram product comprises computer executable code embodied in anon-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on themobile device, performs the steps of the method 900. It will beunderstood that, while the method 900 described above is referenced toevents occurring when there is no user interaction, other types ofunexpected behavior may also or instead be identified. This may, forexample, include any behavior atypical for a user even when userpresence is detected, such as a large number of texts or emails while auser is playing a game on the mobile device. Thus, context such as timeof day, open applications, current user interactions, and the like maybe used instead of or in addition to detections of user presence asuseful context for detecting unexpected behavior.

FIG. 10 shows an example display of a mobile device according to animplementation. The mobile device 1000 may be configured for protectionagainst malware as described herein. The mobile device 1000 may be, forexample, any of the endpoints or other computing devices describedabove. The mobile device 1000 may be, for example, a smart phone or atablet. In general, the mobile device 1000 may include a display 1002, acommunications interface 1004 configured to couple the mobile device1000 in a communicating relationship with a network, a processor 1006, amemory 1008, a camera 1010, and a microphone 1012.

The communications interface 1004 may include hardware and software forcommunications using a variety of protocols such as a short rangecommunications protocol (e.g., Bluetooth), a wireless communicationsprotocol (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular network, and so on), and so forth. Thecommunications interface 1004 may couple the mobile device 1000 to acellular network or the like through a mobile carrier with which a userhas a billing account. The communications interface 1004 may also orinstead couple the mobile device 1000 to a data network through whichthe mobile device 1000 can access an online application store or thelike.

In an aspect, the memory 1008 bears computer code that, when executingon the processor 1006, performs steps for securing the mobile device1000 against malware. These steps may include monitoring a plurality ofevents executed on the mobile device such as any of the events describedabove, and detecting a first event in the plurality of events. The firstevent may be an unexpected event generated by an application executingon the mobile device 1000 while a user of the mobile device 1000 is notinteracting with the application. The steps for securing the mobiledevice 1000 against malware may further include evaluating the firstevent in a context of the mobile device 1000 to determine whether thefirst event is potentially unauthorized. When the first event is apotentially unauthorized event, the steps for securing the mobile device1000 against malware may include presenting a warning to the user thatthe potentially unauthorized event has occurred.

The display 1002 may include a touch screen or other device forreceiving user input that can be used to detect user presence or userinteraction as contemplated herein. The camera 1010 or microphone 1012may also be configured to detect and identify the user and receive userinput indicating of user presence and/or interaction. In another aspect,the mobile device 1000 may include one or more buttons 1014 forreceiving manual user input that can be used to generate userinteraction events indicative of user interaction and presence. Moregenerally, any hardware, software, or combination of these suitable forreceiving user input or otherwise detecting user presence or intent maybe used to create indications of user interaction as contemplatedherein.

As shown in the exemplary display, security functionality has identifiedan unexpected event, in this case a request by application “BaddApp” toaccess the web site: ‘www.baddsite.com.’ The exemplary display requestsuser confirmation that the unexpected event be permitted to continue. Inthis way, the device can determine whether a user is aware of theactivity and whether the activity is authorized.

In an aspect, the display on the mobile device requesting confirmationby the user may be related to activity on the mobile device. In anaspect, the display on the mobile device requesting confirmation by theuser may be related to activity on another endpoint. Another device,such as a gateway or another endpoint, identifies a potential or actualsecurity threat. Using a heartbeat functionality on the mobile device,an instruction to the mobile device is communicated securely to requestuser the confirmation of activity on the mobile, device, another deviceor recognized by the another device (e.g., a gateway). In an aspect, thedisplay may require authentication, or submission of authentication datasuch as a PIN, password, biometric information, etc. to confirmauthorization.

The above systems, devices, methods, processes, and the like may berealized in hardware, software, or any combination of these suitable fora particular application. The hardware may include a general-purposecomputer and/or dedicated computing device. This includes realization inone or more microprocessors, microcontrollers, embeddedmicrocontrollers, programmable digital signal processors or otherprogrammable devices or processing circuitry, along with internal and/orexternal memory. This may also, or instead, include one or moreapplication specific integrated circuits, programmable gate arrays,programmable array logic components, or any other device or devices thatmay be configured to process electronic signals. It will further beappreciated that a realization of the processes or devices describedabove may include computer-executable code created using a structuredprogramming language such as C, an object oriented programming languagesuch as C++, or any other high-level or low-level programming language(including assembly languages, hardware description languages, anddatabase programming languages and technologies) that may be stored,compiled or interpreted to run on one of the above devices, as well asheterogeneous combinations of processors, processor architectures, orcombinations of different hardware and software. In another aspect, themethods may be embodied in systems that perform the steps thereof, andmay be distributed across devices in a number of ways. At the same time,processing may be distributed across devices such as the various systemsdescribed above, or all of the functionality may be integrated into adedicated, standalone device or other hardware. In another aspect, meansfor performing the steps associated with the processes described abovemay include any of the hardware and/or software described above. Allsuch permutations and combinations are intended to fall within the scopeof the present disclosure.

Embodiments disclosed herein may include computer program productscomprising computer-executable code or computer-usable code that, whenexecuting on one or more computing devices, performs any and/or all ofthe steps thereof. The code may be stored in a non-transitory fashion ina computer memory, which may be a memory from which the program executes(such as random access memory associated with a processor), or a storagedevice such as a disk drive, flash memory or any other optical,electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared or other device or combination ofdevices. In another aspect, any of the systems and methods describedabove may be embodied in any suitable transmission or propagation mediumcarrying computer-executable code and/or any inputs or outputs fromsame.

The elements described and depicted herein, including in flow charts andblock diagrams throughout the figures, imply logical boundaries betweenthe elements. However, according to software or hardware engineeringpractices, the depicted elements and the functions thereof may beimplemented on machines through computer executable media having aprocessor capable of executing program instructions stored thereon as amonolithic software structure, as standalone software modules, or asmodules that employ external routines, code, services, and so forth, orany combination of these, and all such implementations may be within thescope of the present disclosure. Examples of such machines may include,but may not be limited to, personal digital assistants, laptops,personal computers, mobile phones, other handheld computing devices,medical equipment, wired or wireless communication devices, transducers,chips, calculators, satellites, tablet PCs, electronic books, gadgets,electronic devices, devices having artificial intelligence, computingdevices, networking equipment, servers, routers and the like.Furthermore, the elements depicted in the flow chart and block diagramsor any other logical component may be implemented on a machine capableof executing program instructions. Thus, while the foregoing drawingsand descriptions set forth functional aspects of the disclosed systems,no particular arrangement of software for implementing these functionalaspects should be inferred from these descriptions unless explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Similarly, it may beappreciated that the various steps identified and described above may bevaried, and that the order of steps may be adapted to particularapplications of the techniques disclosed herein. All such variations andmodifications are intended to fall within the scope of this disclosure.As such, the depiction and/or description of an order for various stepsshould not be understood to require a particular order of execution forthose steps, unless required by a particular application, or explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Absent an explicitindication to the contrary, the disclosed steps may be modified,supplemented, omitted, and/or re-ordered without departing from thescope of this disclosure. Numerous variations, additions, omissions, andother modifications will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in theart. In addition, the order or presentation of method steps in thedescription and drawings above is not intended to require this order ofperforming the recited steps unless a particular order is expresslyrequired or otherwise clear from the context.

The method steps of the implementations described herein are intended toinclude any suitable method of causing such method steps to beperformed, consistent with the patentability of the following claims,unless a different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear fromthe context. So for example performing the step of X includes anysuitable method for causing another party such as a remote user, aremote processing resource (e.g., a server or cloud computer) or amachine to perform the step of X. Similarly, performing steps X, Y and Zmay include any method of directing or controlling any combination ofsuch other individuals or resources to perform steps X, Y and Z toobtain the benefit of such steps. Thus method steps of theimplementations described herein are intended to include any suitablemethod of causing one or more other parties or entities to perform thesteps, consistent with the patentability of the following claims, unlessa different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear from thecontext. Such parties or entities need not be under the direction orcontrol of any other party or entity, and need not be located within aparticular jurisdiction.

It will be appreciated that the methods and systems described above areset forth by way of example and not of limitation. Numerous variations,additions, omissions, and other modifications will be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art. In addition, the order or presentation ofmethod steps in the description and drawings above is not intended torequire this order of performing the recited steps unless a particularorder is expressly required or otherwise clear from the context. Thus,while particular embodiments have been shown and described, it will beapparent to those skilled in the art that various changes andmodifications in form and details may be made therein without departingfrom the spirit and scope of this disclosure and are intended to form apart of the invention as defined by the following claims, which are tobe interpreted in the broadest sense allowable by law.

1. A computer program product for monitoring network security based onendpoint user presence, the computer program product comprising computerexecutable code embodied in a non-transitory computer readable mediumthat, when executing on a gateway in an enterprise network, performs thesteps of: connecting an endpoint to a data network through the gateway;detecting a network request by a process executing on the endpoint to aremote resource that presents a potential security risk including atleast one of a request to download an executable in violation of anetwork security policy or a request directed to an unknown address inviolation of the network security policy; evaluating a status of theendpoint to determine whether a user is present at the endpoint; andexecuting a security measure in response to the network request when nouser is detected at the endpoint.
 2. The computer program product ofclaim 1 wherein evaluating the status of the endpoint includes examininga secure heartbeat from the endpoint for information about whether theuser is present.
 3. The computer program product of claim 1 whereinevaluating the status of the endpoint includes transmitting a request tothe endpoint for a user input.
 4. The computer program product of claim1 wherein the status includes whether a user is logged in to theendpoint.
 5. The computer program product of claim 1 wherein the statusincludes whether a display of the endpoint is locked.
 6. The computerprogram product of claim 1 wherein the status includes a record ofkeyboard or mouse activity within a predetermined time window.
 7. Amethod of operating a gateway comprising: connecting an endpoint to adata network through the gateway; detecting a network request by aprocess executing on the endpoint to a remote resource that presents apotential security risk; evaluating a status of the endpoint todetermine whether a user is present at the endpoint; and executing asecurity measure in response to the network request when no user isdetected at the endpoint.
 8. The method of claim 7 wherein the networkrequest includes a request for a download of an executable from the datanetwork.
 9. The method of claim 7 wherein the network request includes arequest directed to an unknown address.
 10. The method of claim 7wherein the network request includes a request directed to a knownsource of malware.
 11. The method of claim 7 wherein evaluating thestatus of the endpoint includes querying the endpoint about whether theuser is present.
 12. The method of claim 7 wherein evaluating the statusof the endpoint includes examining a secure heartbeat from the endpointfor information about whether the user is present.
 13. The method ofclaim 7 wherein evaluating the status of the endpoint includestransmitting a request to the endpoint for a user input.
 14. The methodof claim 7 wherein the status includes whether a user is logged in tothe endpoint.
 15. The method of claim 7 wherein the status includeswhether a display of the endpoint is locked.
 16. The method of claim 7wherein the status includes a record of keyboard or mouse activitywithin a predetermined time window.
 17. A system comprising: a networkdevice including a network interface configured to couple in acommunicating relationship with a data network that includes anendpoint; a memory on the network device; and a processor on the networkdevice, the processor configured to execute instructions stored in thememory to perform the steps of connecting an endpoint to the networkdevice through the network interface, detecting a network request by aprocess executing on the endpoint to a remote resource that presents apotential security risk, evaluating a status of the endpoint todetermine whether a user is present at the endpoint, and executing asecurity measure in response to the network request when no user isdetected at the endpoint.
 18. The system of claim 17 wherein the networkdevice includes a firewall.
 19. The system of claim 17 wherein thenetwork device includes a gateway.
 20. The system of claim 17 whereinthe network device includes a threat management facility.
 21. A systemcomprising: an endpoint including a network interface configured tocouple the endpoint in a communicating relationship with a data network;a memory on the endpoint; and a processor on the endpoint, the processorconfigured to execute instructions stored in the memory to perform thesteps of monitoring a status of the endpoint, periodically creating astatus indicator characterizing the status, generating a user presenceindicator containing an indication of whether a human user is present atthe endpoint, creating a heartbeat containing the status indicator andthe user presence indicator, and transmitting the heartbeat through thenetwork interface to a gateway that couples the endpoint to a datanetwork. 22-41. (canceled)